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1. Introduction 
I study how a fundamental property of financial reporting (i.e., accounting conservatism) 
affects the correlation between the returns of stocks and bonds issued by the same firm.1 The 
sensitivity of corporate bond returns to changes in the value of equity (i.e., the hedge ratio) is a 
fundamental input for portfolio asset allocation. Since imperfect correlation of asset returns is a 
key assumption in portfolio theory (Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964), stock-bond return co-
movement is important to determine the diversification benefits of bonds, and to hedge common 
exposures across the two asset markets. Because bonds exhibit on average lower expected 
returns, a higher stock-bond return co-movement implies a greater allocation to equities.2  
The relation between bondholders and shareholders’ claims on the firm’s assets has been 
largely investigated in the finance literature (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974). According 
to structural models of default risk, an upward revision in firm expected cash flow should 
increase both the value of equity (because of increased profitability) and the value of debt 
(because of lower bankruptcy risk). Hence, ceteris paribus, stock and bond returns should exhibit 
a positive correlation on average. 
However, differences in the payoff structures of shareholders and bondholders may give 
rise to agency conflicts (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Shareholders may expropriate 
bondholders’ wealth by engaging in risk shifting activities (i.e., by switching from safe to risky 
investments). These wealth transfers from bondholders to shareholders represent a manifestation 
of agency problems which reduce (or even reverse) the correlation between stock and bond 
returns.  
                                                 
1 I henceforth use the terms stock-bond return correlation and stock-bond return co-movement interchangeably. 
2 To appreciate the investment implications of cross-sectional and time-series variation in stock-bond return co-
movement, a research report by MSCI (2009) estimates that a change in stock-bond return correlation from -0.5 to 
+0.5 would imply an increase in the optimal portfolio allocation of stocks from 36% to 67%.  Therefore, a better 
understanding of the fundamental drivers behind the extent of co-movement is warranted. 
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If bondholders rationally anticipate the possibility of these conflicts, they will accordingly 
price-protect themselves by requiring a higher rate of return on their investment. Ultimately, 
therefore, shareholders will bear the deadweight costs of risk shifting. Shareholders, however, 
may ex ante signal their commitment to refrain from opportunistic behaviour through several 
contracting devices (e.g., debt covenants). Prior research shows that, similar to debt covenants, 
high-quality financial reporting acts as an efficient contracting mechanism that limits 
shareholders’ ability to shift risk to bondholders (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Ball et al., 2008; 
Biddle et al., 2009; Bushman et al., 2011). In particular, the property of asymmetric recognition 
of gains and losses (i.e., accounting conservatism) (Basu, 1997; Watts 2003a and 2003b) meets 
creditors’ differential demand for positive and negative earnings innovations given the payoff 
structure of their claim.3 Conservatism provides a timely and credible signal to creditors because 
it increases the likelihood of covenant violations and facilitates early transfer of decision rights to 
creditors (Nikolaev, 2010; Tan, 2013).  
I therefore argue that accounting conservatism, by decreasing ex ante shareholders’ 
incentives to expropriate bondholders’ wealth (i.e., agency cost of debt), increases ex post the 
extent of stock-bond return co-movement. Moreover, as agency conflicts between shareholders 
and bondholders are more severe when default risk is higher (Eisdorfer, 2008) and debt 
maturities are longer (Leland and Toft, 1996), I hypothesize the effect of conservatism on stock-
bond correlation to be more pronounced in these instances.4 Lastly, as prior research shows that 
                                                 
3 The accounting literature distinguishes between conditional and unconditional conservatism (see for example: Ball 
and Shivakumar, 2005; Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007). Since prior research shows that it is unclear whether or 
not unconditional conservatism enhances debt contracting efficiency (Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; 2006), I focus my 
analysis on conditional conservatism. The asymmetric timeliness property of conditional conservatism has been 
shown to play a crucial contracting and monitoring role (Beaver and Ryan, 2005).  
4 The fact that the effect of conservatism on stock-bond return correlation is hypothesized to be more pronounced 
when default risk is higher and, therefore, when one would ex-ante predict a higher stock-bond return correlation, 
creates significant challenges to my empirical analysis. I discuss these challenges, as well as the strategy I employ to 
address them, in detail in Section 4. 
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the demand for accounting conservatism increases when firms rely more on debt covenants 
(Nikolaev, 2010; Tan, 2013), I contend that firms with more conservative financial reports and 
with more covenants in their bond contracts exhibit on average stronger stock-bond return co-
movement. 
I test my predictions on a sample of 48,597 (1,478) bond-month (bond) observations 
pertaining to 301 unique firms. To analyze the relation between stock-bond return co-movement 
and accounting conservatism, I follow prior research and regress monthly bond returns on equity 
and treasury returns to calculate implied hedge ratios (my proxy for co-movement). To capture 
the degree of asymmetric loss recognition in financial reports, I use a quarterly estimation of the 
Khan and Watts’ (2009) firm-level conservatism measure (Tan, 2013; Heflin et al., 2014).  
In line with my predictions, I find that the correlation between stock and bond returns is 
increasing in the extent of accounting conservatism, and that the effect of conservatism is more 
pronounced when default risk is higher and bond maturities are longer. Further, I provide support 
for the idea that conservatism and debt covenants are both efficient contracting mechanisms. I 
show that co-movement is stronger for firms that use more covenants in their bond contracts and 
report more conservatively. The results are robust to alternative proxies for accounting 
conservatism as well to controls for bond-, firm- and macro-level determinants of stock-bond 
return correlation.  
Further, to provide evidence of a causal link between accounting conservatism and co-
movement, I run a battery of tests to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. Results from these 
tests suggest that the relation I document is not affected by omitted correlated variables problems 
or reverse causality issues. While each of these tests could be subject to criticism, the fact that 
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the evidence from each individual test supports the idea of a causal link between conservatism 
and stock-bond return correlation provides support for such a causal relation. 
This study contributes to the literature that seeks to understand the role of accounting 
information in credit markets along several dimensions. First, by showing that accounting 
conservatism, a fundamental property of financial reporting information, explains cross-sectional 
variation in stock-bond return co-movement, I contribute to the literature that examines the credit 
market implications of information transparency (e.g., Daffie and Lando, 2001; Yu, 2005; 
Beaver et al., 2012; Arora et al., 2014).5 
Second, my study is related to the literature on the economic consequences accounting 
conservatism (e.g., Ahmed et al., 2002; Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008; Francis and Martin, 
2010; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011; Tan, 2013; Kravet, 2014). I complement this line of research 
by showing how the ability of conservatism to mitigate agency conflicts between shareholders 
and creditors extends to the co-movement of bonds and stocks.   
Third, following the call from Lok and Richardson (2011) who highlight the need for more 
empirical studies on the role of accounting information in guiding portfolio asset allocation, I 
show how accounting conservatism affects firm-specific stock-bond return co-movement which 
in turn has important implications for portfolio allocation decisions. While the importance of 
aggregate stock-bond return co-movement for asset allocation is immediately clear, the 
relevance of firm-specific co-movement is not straightforward.6 Firm-specific co-movement 
matters for asset allocation decisions because wealth transfers from debtholders to shareholders 
                                                 
5 Duffie and Lando (2001) theoretically demonstrate that the opaqueness of accounting information leads to different 
predictions on the shape of the term structure of credit spreads. Other studies (Yu, 2005; Beaver et al., 2012; Correia 
et al., 2012; Arora et al., 2014; Correia et al., 2015) highlight how different features of financial reporting affect the 
credit market. 
6 While several studies focus on stock-bond return co-movement at the aggregate level (Keim and Stambaugh, 1986; 
Campbell and Ammer, 1993; Yang et al., 2009; Baele et al., 2010; Baker and Wurgler, 2012; Campbell et al., 2015), 
firm-level evidence is surprisingly scant. Among the few exceptions, Kwan (1996) finds that the degree of stock-
bond return correlation is likely to be influenced by firm-specific information about the firm’s net assets. 
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are unlikely to be independent across firms and, as a result, are difficult to diversify. Especially 
in periods of economic downturn, debt-equity conflicts may deteriorate systematically across 
firms in the economy, and thus many firms may exhibit wealth transfers at the same time. 
Consequently, understanding how accounting conservatism relates to firm-level co-movement of 
equity and bond returns is of importance for the optimal allocation of funds across the two asset 
classes.7 
Fourth, my findings contribute to the literature that tries to understand the links between 
financial reporting properties and the use of covenants in public debt contracts (Nikolaev, 2010; 
Amiraslani et al., 2015). While Nikolaev (2010) and Amiraslani et al. (2015) investigate the 
complementarities between conservatism and bond covenants as contracting mechanisms, my 
focus is on their combined effect on stock-bond return correlation. 
Finally, I provide new insights to the finance literature that empirically assesses the ability 
of structural models of credit risk to price corporate bonds (Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Huang 
and Huang, 2003; Arora et al., 2005; Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008; Correia et al., 2012; Bao 
and Pan, 2013) by offering empirical support for the role of accounting information as theorized 
by Duffie and Lando (2001).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary 
background to the study and discusses the hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the 
sample selection procedure. Section 4 describes the empirical analysis. Section 5 presents a set of 
robustness tests, and Section 6 concludes. 
                                                 
7 Conservatism may also affect systematic risk and asset allocation through other channels. For example, it is 
possible that a stronger stock-bond co-movement is associated with a lower role of private information regarding the 
correlation between debt and equity returns, thus lowering the premium required by uninformed investors in the 
spirit of Easley and O’Hara (2004). Conservatism may also affect actual cash flows (i.e., may generate a real effect), 
as well as the assessed correlation between the cash flows to each firm’s different security holders and the cash 
flows of the other firms in the market (Lambert et al., 2007). 
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2. Background and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Stock-Bond Return Co-Movement and Shareholder-Bondholder Conflicts  
The finance literature has extensively studied the phenomenon of stock-bond return 
correlation at the aggregate level (Keim and Stambaugh, 1986; Campbell and Ammer, 1993; 
Yang et al., 2009; Baele et al., 2010; Baker and Wurgler, 2012; Campbell et al., 2015) providing 
evidence on how macroeconomic factors impact the return association across portfolios of stocks 
and bonds. Prior studies find that stock and bonds exhibit a positive (albeit small) return co-
movement with substantial time-series variation (e.g., Connolly et al., 2005; Baele et al., 2010). 
However, evidence on stock-bond co-movement at the firm level (i.e., return correlation 
between stocks and bonds issued by the same firm) is surprisingly scant. Kwan (1996) and 
Hotchkiss and Ronen (1999) document a positive firm-level co-movement of stocks and (high-
yield) bonds. Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008) find that the magnitude of stock-bond co-
movement is in line with the Merton (1974) model implied hedge ratio. Bao and Hou (2014) 
extend the Merton (1974) model and show that corporate bond maturity and credit risk are 
factors associated with stronger co-movement. In line with that, Bhanot et al. (2010) find that 
takeover risk explains cross-sectional variation in the correlation between stock and bond 
returns. Finally, Nieto and Rodriguez (2015) show that co-movement has important implications 
for capital structure choices.  
Similarly to aggregate co-movement, understanding firm-specific stock-bond return 
correlation and its cross-sectional determinants is important for asset allocation. This is because 
wealth transfers from debtholders to shareholders are likely correlated across firms (especially 
during periods of economic downturn) and hence very difficult to diversify. 
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The returns expected by shareholders and bondholders should exhibit, on average, a 
positive correlation because an improvement in investors’ expectations about future earnings 
increases both the value of equity and debt (Leland, 1994; Klock et al., 2005).  
However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that differences in payoff structure between 
equity and debt claims may give rise to potential conflicts between shareholders and 
bondholders. Following a standard option-pricing framework (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 
1974), while the value of equity mimics a call option on the firm’s assets, the value of debt 
resembles a put option. In the presence of risky debt, shareholders have incentives to shift risk to 
bondholders by taking actions that increase asset volatility. Whereas increased risk benefits 
shareholders (the value of the call increases), it provides detriment to bondholders (the value of 
the put decreases). As a consequence, conflicts between shareholders and bondholders make 
stock and bond returns become less synchronous (i.e., less positively correlated).  
Shareholders may expropriate wealth from bondholders by switching from safe to risky 
investment strategies (i.e., asset substitution). If risky investments perform well, shareholders get 
most of the gains (the value of their call option increases), whereas bondholders bear most of the 
cost because of their limited upside potential (Fama and Miller, 1972; Parrino and Weisbach, 
1999; Flor, 2011). Similarly, if bonds are priced under the assumption that no additional debt 
securities will be issued by the firm, bondholders may be expropriated if additional bonds of 
equal or higher priority are issued (i.e., claim dilution). Masulis (1980) shows that, when firms 
issue additional debt or exchange preferred stock for outstanding common stock, existing 
creditors bear more risk on average.8 
                                                 
8 Other instances in which stockholder-bondholder conflicts become particularly important are: (i) dividend 
distributions (Handjinicolaou and Kalay, 1984); (ii) leveraged buyouts (Warga and Welch, 1993); (iii) spin-offs 
(Parrino, 1997; Maxwell and Rao, 2003); and (iv) stock repurchases (Maxwell and Stephens, 2003). 
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Rational bondholders anticipate shareholders’ incentives to engage in wealth transfers and 
accordingly price-protect themselves by transferring the ensuing costs to the firm (i.e., the cost of 
debt increases) (Jensen and Smith, 1985). Since shareholders ultimately bear the costs of 
conflicts with bondholders, they have strong incentives to put in place contractual mechanisms 
ex ante to mitigate the agency cost of debt ex post.  
The finance literature emphasizes the role of different contracting mechanisms through 
which the incentives of creditors and shareholders can be aligned (Bodie and Taggart 1978; 
Smith et al., 1991; Myers, 1997; Nash et al., 2003). Firms typically mitigate shareholder-
bondholder conflicts by using restrictive covenants in their debt contracts (Lehn and Poulsen, 
1991; Smith and Warner, 1979; Billett et al., 2007; Chava and Roberts, 2008; Nini et al., 2009; 
Wittenberg-Moerman, 2008; Nikolaev, 2010; Christensen et al., 2016) or by keeping the 
maturity of their debt short (Ozkan, 2000). Covenants that constrain the borrowing firm’s 
production and investment policies (including mergers and acquisition restrictions), as well as 
those that limit financing activities (issuance of new debt or equity instruments) or payout policy, 
mitigate the asset substitution and claim dilution problems.  
Covenants, however, are associated with significant costs for the firm as they cannot fully 
address the agency cost of debt for at least two reasons. First, because a firm’s investment 
opportunity set is unobservable and hence cannot be contracted upon (i.e., markets are 
incomplete), covenants cannot effectively monitor all possible investment decisions. Second, 
when covenants become binding, they may cause either failure to abandon unproductive 
investments, or inability to invest in positive net present value projects. As a consequence, firms 
typically trade off costs and benefits of using covenants in their debt contracts (Smith and 
Warner, 1976; Nash et al., 2003). 
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2.2. Link between Stock-Bond Return Co-Movement and Accounting Information 
Along with covenants, firms may use other contracting mechanisms to (further) enhance 
the efficiency of debt contracting and mitigate shareholders’ incentives to expropriate 
bondholders. The quality of financial reporting has been shown to complement other contracting 
mechanisms to mitigate the agency cost of debt. A number of studies finds that high-quality 
financial reporting improves investment efficiency and limits shareholders’ ability to shift risk to 
bondholders (Bushman and Smith, 2001; Biddle et al., 2009). 
Financial reporting quality is inherently a multi-dimensional concept (Francis et al., 2004; 
Dechow et al., 2010) and different stakeholders are likely to be interested in different properties 
of accounting information. Creditors regard accounting information as of high quality if it 
provides them with a credible (and timely) signal to assess the credit standing of the firm. 
Because creditors’ claims have an asymmetric payoff structure, creditors are more sensitive to 
increases, rather than decreases, in default risk and hence put more weight on the left tail of the 
earnings distribution.9  
This idea of creditors’ differential demand for positive and negative earnings innovations is 
theoretically linked to the concept of accounting conservatism (Basu, 1997; Watts 2003a and 
2003b). Several empirical studies suggest that the asymmetric recognition of gains and losses 
inherent in conservative financial reports enhances contracting efficiency (Watts 2003a and 
2003b; Ball and Shivakumar, 2005; Francis and Martin, 2010; Ahmed and Duellman, 2011; 
Kravet, 2014) by reducing shareholders’ incentives to expropriate creditors (Ahmed et al., 2002; 
Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008; Tan 2013). By putting downwards pressure on earnings (i.e., 
                                                 
9 Easton et al. (2009) show that bond price reactions to earnings announcements tend to be larger for high-yield 
bonds and generally stronger when earnings convey bad news. Similarly, Shivakumar et al. (2010) find that cash 
flow news via management forecasts exhibit a stronger association with bond returns when credit ratings are lower 
and during the financial crisis. 
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asymmetric recognition of bad news relative to good news) accounting conservatism increases 
the likelihood of covenant violations and facilitates early transfer of decision rights to creditors 
(Nikolaev, 2010; Tan, 2013; Christensen et al., 2016).10 
Although the idea that accounting conservatism enhances contracting efficiency appears 
undoubtedly appealing, theoretical studies do not provide uniform support for this view. On the 
one hand, Kwon et al. (2001) demonstrate that conservatism efficiently motivates managers in a 
principal-agent setting, and Guay and Verrecchia (2007) show that conservatism enhances 
quality and timeliness of disclosure. On the other hand, Gigler et al. (2009) derive conditions 
under which accounting conservatism decreases contracting efficiency, i.e., when the costs 
associated with the measurement error induced by conservative reporting outweigh its benefits. 
The main idea is that contracts are endogenous and can be designed differently depending on the 
level of conservatism (i.e., contracts can incorporate direct adjustments to accounting 
information). Several subsequent theory studies relax the assumptions in Gigler et al. (2009). 
Caskey and Hughes (2012) show that conservatism mitigates the asset substitution problem. 
Chen et al. (2007) argue that conservative accounting reduces managerial incentives to 
manipulate earnings upwards. Gox and Wagenhofer (2009) show that conservatism maximizes 
the ex-ante probability of obtaining debt financing. Jiang (2012; 2016) argues that whether 
conservatism affects debt contracting depends on the interaction between accounting and non-
accounting information. Finally, Gao (2013) formalizes a general rationale for accounting 
conservatism as a measurement principle using an incomplete contracting setting. Taken 
together, insights from analytical studies suggest that a trade-off between costs and benefits of 
                                                 
10 Moreover, DeFond et al. (2012) provide support for the conjecture that conservatism mitigates bankruptcy risk 
through its cash enhancing and informational properties. 
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conservatism explain the extent to which conservatism affects contracting efficiency (Chen et al., 
2010). 
 
2.3. Predictions  
When agency conflicts between shareholders and bondholders are severe stock-bond return 
co-movement is less positive. Prior empirical literature shows that accounting conservatism is 
one of the monitoring mechanisms capable of reducing the likelihood of these conflicts (Ahmed 
et al., 2002; Beatty et al., 2008; Zhang, 2008; Chun et al., 2011; Costello and Wittenberg-
Moerman, 2011; Tan, 2013). By providing bondholders with a credible signal of poor 
performance that allows them more time to take remedial actions, accounting conservatism 
mitigates the extent of risk shifting. I therefore expect more conservative firms to exhibit, on 
average, stronger co-movement. 
H1: Stock-bond return co-movement increases in accounting conservatism. 
Both time- and firm-specific changes in conservatism are likely to be associated with 
variation in stock-bond return co-movement. Observable commitment to conservative reporting 
mitigates agency costs and therefore limits shareholders’ ability to shift risk to bondholders. At 
the same time though, agency concerns vary over time for a given firm,11 and therefore a firm-
specific increase in conservatism, by decreasing shareholders’ incentives to expropriate 
bondholders’ wealth, would in turn generate an increase in stock-bond return co-movement. 
H1 predicts that accounting conservatism increases the extent of co-movement between 
stock and bond returns. However, analytical studies (Gigler et al., 2009; Gao, 2013) show that 
the endogenous nature of financial contracts implies that these contracts may incorporate 
                                                 
11 An example is a change in information asymmetry between equity and debt investors caused by a firm-specific 
reduction in growth opportunities (LaFond and Watts, 2008). 
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adjustments to take into account different degrees of accounting conservatism. To the extent that 
financial contracts are designed with direct adjustments H1 may not hold. 
Option pricing theory (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1974) which characterizes the 
value of equity (debt) as a call (put) option on the firm’s assets, shows that, as the volatility of 
assets increases (i.e., higher default risk), bondholders’ claims become more equity-like and 
hence stock-bond correlation becomes stronger (Schaefer and Strebulaev 2008; Lok and 
Richardson, 2011; Bao and Hou, 2014). Conversely, a lower default risk reduces bondholders’ 
sensitivity to improvements in earnings expectations and makes stock and bond returns less 
synchronous. 
The presence of risky debt makes shareholder-bondholder conflicts become more severe 
(i.e., agency cost of debt). When default risk increases, the non-linearity in bondholders’ payoff 
structure provides shareholders with more incentives to shift risk to bondholders (Eisdorfer, 
2008). Moreover, Caskey and Hughes (2012) argue that conservatism can increase contracting 
efficiency when moral hazard problems (e.g., asset substitution) are severe. I therefore predict 
that this higher demand for accounting conservatism is associated with stronger co-movement. 
H2: The effect of conservatism on stock-bond return co-movement is stronger the higher the risk 
of default. 
Bao and Hou (2014) find that, consistent with the predictions of the Merton (1974) model, 
bonds with longer maturities tends to co-move more with equities. This is because bonds with 
longer maturities are junior in the capital structure and thus more equity-like. Risky debt 
increases shareholder-bondholder conflicts and in turn generates greater demand for contracting 
mechanisms, such as conservative reporting, to exert contingent allocation of control rights 
(Smith and Warner, 1979). In line with this argument, Khurana and Wang (2015) find that debt 
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maturity is associated with the extent of accounting conservatism. Consequently, I expect the 
effect of conservatism on stock-bond return co-movement to be stronger the longer the bond 
maturity.  
H3: The effect of conservatism on stock-bond return co-movement is increasing in bond 
maturity. 
Debt covenants are designed to mitigate shareholder-bondholder conflicts and constitute a 
key feature of debt contracts. Covenants act as tripwires by facilitating a timely transfer of 
control rights to creditors when performance deteriorates (Smith and Warner, 1979; Chava and 
Roberts, 2008). Nikolaev (2010) finds that the demand for accounting conservatism increases 
when firms rely more on covenants in their public debt contracts. Tan (2013) provides evidence 
consistent with the conjecture that firms’ financial reporting becomes more conservative in the 
event of a covenant violation. The evidence from prior studies collectively suggests that 
covenants and conservatism are both effective mechanisms that firms use to mitigate the agency 
cost of debt. I therefore expect accounting conservatism and the use of covenants in bond 
contracts to jointly increase stock-bond return correlation.  
H4: Accounting conservatism together with bond covenants increases stock-bond return co-
movement. 
 
3. Data  
3.1. Sample Selection  
Data on secondary market corporate bond transactions are from the Financial Industry 
Regulatory Authority’s (FINRA) Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE). Since July 
2002 the TRACE database disseminates bond transaction information as a result of an initiative 
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to increase price transparency. As Easton et al. (2009), Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012) and others 
point out, the main advantage of TRACE is the reliance on actual trades, whereas other 
commercial databases, such as Datastream for example, provide bond quotes potentially 
contaminated by matrix pricing and other types of adjustments.  
The sample selection starts with the universe of TRACE corporate bond transactions from 
July 2002 to December 2012. I then merge bond transaction information from TRACE with 
bond-level characteristics provided by Mergent FISD to restrict the sample to “straight bonds” 
by eliminating those that are callable, puttable, exchangeable, asset-backed, enhanced, preferred, 
convertible, and with variable coupon rates. Next, I limit the sample to bonds that are issued by 
non-financial U.S. firms (SIC codes 6000-6999 are excluded), are denominated in U.S. dollars, 
and are not privately placed under SEC Rule 144A. I then merge bond-level information from 
the intersection of TRACE-Mergent FISD with Compustat and CRSP following the three-step 
procedure described by Easton et al. (2009). First, I match bond issuer CUSIPs reported in 
Mergent FISD with CUSIP information provided by Compustat if an unambiguous match is 
available. Second, I check the validity of the previous matches by verifying company name and 
industry. Third, I manually match those bonds without a CUSIP match to their respective issuers 
by company name and industry membership. Finally, I require availability of credit rating data 
and limit the sample to those observations with available information to compute bond returns, 
equity returns, accounting conservatism, and all other variables included in the baseline model. 
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Applying the above filters, the final sample comprises 48,597 (1,478) bond-month (bond) 
observations pertaining to 301 unique firms (i.e., multiple bonds per issuer are retained in the 
sample).12 
 
3.2. Bond Returns  
To calculate monthly bond returns from TRACE intra-day transaction data, I first apply the 
filters proposed by Dick-Nielsen (2012) to eliminate the effects of erroneous reports by deleting: 
(i) true duplicate transactions identified by the same message sequence number; (ii) reversals of 
original trades; and (iii) same-day corrections. Next, following Bessembinder et al. (2009), who 
point out that relying on the last trade of the day could introduce noise when last trades are small, 
I compute daily bond flat prices by weighting each intra-day trade by its size. This approach puts 
more weight on institutional trades (i.e., larger trades) and is likely to reflect more accurately the 
underlying daily flat price. Next, for each bond, I calculate the monthly adjusted buy and hold 
returns (ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠) by using the last trade of the month as follows: 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ ൌ ቌ ௝ܲ,௠
൅ ܣܫ௝,௠ ൅ ܫ௝,௠ ܥ௝ܰ
௝ܲ,௠ିଵ ൅ ܣܫ௝,௠ିଵ െ 1ቍ െ ݎ ௠݂
ଵ௠, (1)
where ௝ܲ,௠	is the flat price of bond ݆ at the end of month ݉; ܣܫ௝,௠ is the accrued interest 
accumulated from the previous coupon payment; ܥ௝ is the annual coupon rate; ܰ is the coupon 
frequency per year; ܫ௝,௠ is an indicator variable taking the value of one if the coupon is due 
within the month, and zero otherwise; and ݎ ௠݂ଵ௠ is the return on the one-month treasury bill up to 
month ݉. 
                                                 
12 In Section 5.3 I perform an addition analysis where I limit the sample to “representative bonds.” The sample used 
in the representative bond analysis includes only one bond per issuer. These bonds are selected following the criteria 
suggested by Haesen et al. (2013) to identify liquid and cross-sectionally comparable bonds. 
16 
 
3.3. Firm-Specific Measure of Accounting Conservatism  
Existing literature has proposed a variety of conservatism measures. Each measure has its 
strengths and weaknesses. My proxy for accounting conservatism is based on the well-known 
and widely-used Khan and Watts (2009) ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ measure. This choice is motivated by the 
relative advantages of this measure (vis-à-vis other proxies) in my specific setting which requires 
a conservatism measure able to yield consistent estimates with higher frequency data (e.g., 
quarterly data) and capture both cross-sectional and time-series variation in conservatism. 
Nonetheless, because ultimately any empirical proxy captures the underlying construct of 
conservatism with error, to mitigate the concern that my specific conservatism measure is 
potentially subject to some degree of measurement error (Patatoukas and Thomas, 2011), in 
Section 5.1 I consider two alternative conservatism proxies.  
The ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ has the advantage of being a firm-specific measure of accounting 
conservatism. Prior research (e.g., Ettredge et al., 2012; Jayaraman, 2012) has shown that the 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ appropriately captures the timing of conservatism changes, as well as cross-sectional 
variation in different determinants of conservatism such as probability of litigation and 
information asymmetry among investors. The ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ captures cross-sectional variation in 
conservatism through variation in firm-specific characteristics (i.e., size, market-to-book, and 
leverage). Hence, a potential limitation of the ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ is that the identified relation between 
conservatism and the outcome variable may be driven by differences in these firm-specific 
characteristics. To mitigate this concern, the tests presented in Section 5.2 account for the inputs 
to the ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ measure to identify the effect of conservatism on stock-bond return co-movement 
controlling for its firm-specific determinants.  
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As I use monthly bond and equity returns in my analysis, I estimate the Khan and Watts’ 
(2009) ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ measure using quarterly data to minimize the variable measurement frequency 
gap.13 Accordingly, I first estimate a cross-sectional specification of the Basu (1997) model as 
follows: 
ܧ௜,௤ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܦܴ௜,௤ ൅ ߚଶܴ௜,௤ ൅ ߚଷܴ௜,௤ ൈ ܦܴ௜,௤ ൅ ߝ௜, (2)
where ܧ௜,௤	is firm ݅’s quarterly net income before extraordinary items deflated by market value of 
equity at the beginning of fiscal quarter ݍ; ܴ௜,௤	is firm ݅’s three months buy and hold return 
ending one month after the end of fiscal quarter ݍ; ܦܴ௜,௤	is an indicator variable taking the value 
of one if ܴ௜,௤ ൏ 0 and zero otherwise. The coefficient ߚଷ	captures the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings to bad news relative to good news. Khan and Watts (2009) modify model (2) to obtain a 
firm-specific measure of accounting conservatism. Thus, I estimate the following quarterly 
cross-sectional model: 
ܧ௜,௤ ൌ ߚଵ ൅ ߚଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ ൅ ߚଷܯܶܤ௜,௤൅ߚସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤൅ܦܴ௜,௤൫ߛଵ ൅ ߛଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ ൅
ߛଷܯܶܤ௜,௤൅ߛସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤൯ ൅ ܴ௜,௤൫ߤଵ ൅ ߤଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ ൅ ߤଷܯܶܤ௜,௤൅ߤସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤൯ ൅
ܴ௜,௤ ൈ ܦܴ௜,௤൫ߣଵ ൅ ߣଶܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ ൅ ߣଷܯܶܤ௜,௤൅ߣସܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤൯ ൅ ߝ௜,௤, 
(3)
where  ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ is the natural logarithm of market value of equity for firm ݅ at the end of fiscal 
quarter ݍ; ܯܶܤ௜,௤ is the ratio of market value of equity to book value of equity for firm ݅ at the 
end of fiscal quarter ݍ; ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤ is the ratio of total liabilities to market value of equity for 
firm ݅ at the end of fiscal quarter ݍ. All other variables are as previously defined. 
I then calculate a firm-quarter specific measure of accounting conservatism, ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤, as 
follows: 
                                                 
13 Among prior studies using a quarterly approach to estimate the ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁, see: Tan (2013), and Heflin et al. (2014). 
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ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൌ ߣଵ,௤ ൅ ߣଶ,௤ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ ൅ ߣଷ,௤ܯܶܤ௜,௤൅ߣସ,௤ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤. (4)
The empirical estimators ߣ௜, ݅=1 to 4, are constant across firms, but vary over time as they are 
estimated from quarterly cross-sectional regressions. ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ varies across firms through 
cross-sectional variation in firm-quarter characteristics (ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤, ܯܶܤ௜,௤, and ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤). 
Higher values of ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ capture greater degree of conservatism.  
 
3.4. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the distributional properties of the main variables used in the analysis. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentile of their distributions. Detailed 
variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. 
Panel A provides summary statistics for the sample of corporate bonds separately by S&P 
credit rating buckets. The fraction of bonds is generally increasing in credit quality with 
approximately 82% of bonds being investment grade (i.e., BBB credit rating or above). Bonds 
with lower credit ratings tend to be smaller in size (ܨܽܿ݁	ܸ݈ܽݑ ௝݁) and offer higher coupon rates 
(ܥ݋ݑ݌݋݊௝). Across rating buckets, the average time to maturity (ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௠) and duration 
(ܯܽܿܽݑ݈ܽݕ	ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௝,௠) range from six to ten years, and four to seven years, respectively. The 
average (median) monthly adjusted bond return is 0.004 (0.002). Over the sample period, 
investment grade bonds display lower mean, median, and standard deviation of adjusted returns 
relative to speculative bonds.  
Panel B presents descriptive statistics for the 301 bond issuers included in my sample. 
Accounting data are retrieved from Compustat quarterly files, while equity market data come 
from CRSP monthly files. The average (median) firm size measured in terms of market 
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capitalization (ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤) is 22.4 (10.3) billion U.S. dollars, while the average (median) 
monthly adjusted equity return (ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠) is 0.011 (0.011). 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1. Stock-Bond Return Co-movement Baseline Model 
The empirical specification I use to measure stock-bond return correlation is based on the 
following model which, following the approach of Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008), is meant to 
capture the theoretical sensitivity of debt to equity (i.e., the hedge ratio) from the Merton (1974) 
model: 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ ൅ ߚଶܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ ൅	ߝ௝,௠, (5)
where ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ is the adjusted monthly buy and hold bond return of bond ݆ over month 
݉; ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ is the adjusted monthly buy and hold equity return of firm ݅ over month 
݉; ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ is the adjusted monthly buy and hold return of treasuries matched to 
bonds based on their maturity. Because the significance of the coefficients may be affected by 
cross-sectional and time-series correlation, I cluster standard errors in all specifications at the 
firm and year-month level. Following Kwan (1996) and Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008), I use 
bond returns (rather than equity returns) as dependent variable in model (5) to mitigate the 
attenuation bias arising from inaccurately measured regressors. I include treasury returns as 
controls since these are of particular importance for investment grade bonds that are typically 
more sensitive to variation in interest rates rather than firm value. 
Model (5) allows me to gauge the correlation between bond and stock returns and serves as 
a baseline for comparison once I augment the model by including my proxy for conservatism and 
different sets of controls.  
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Table 2, Panel A reports regression results for the whole sample of bonds (column (1)) as 
well as for different S&P bond credit rating buckets (columns (2) to (8)). In line with the 
standard option-pricing framework and with the findings of prior empirical studies (Kwan, 1996; 
Schaefer and Strebulaev, 2008; Bao and Hou, 2014) the correlation between bond and equity 
returns, as measured by the coefficient on ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ is, as expected, positive and 
significant. Also, the extent of stock-bond correlation monotonically strengthens when credit 
quality deteriorates. The p-value of a χ2-test (0.000) confirms that the difference in the 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ coefficients across AAA-rated and CCC-rated bonds is statistically 
significant at conventional levels. 
As expected, treasury returns are also an important determinant of bond returns as shown 
by the positive and significant coefficient on ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠. Moreover, bond returns are 
increasingly more sensitive to changes in treasury returns when credit quality is higher. This is in 
line with the intuition that investment grade bonds with low default risk correlate more with 
treasuries. The p-value of a χ2-test (0.055) confirms that the difference in the 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ coefficients measured across AAA-rated (column (2)) and CCC-rated 
(column (8)) bonds is statistically significant at conventional levels. 
 
4.2. Accounting Conservatism and Stock-Bond Return Co-movement 
To intuitively provide preliminary evidence on the effect conservatism on co-movement, I 
estimate, each month, model (5) separately for firms with high and low levels of accounting 
conservatism using the median value of ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤	as a cut-off. Figure 1 plots the de-trended 
stock-bond return co-movement time-series for high (solid line) versus low (dotted line) 
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conservatism firms and visually suggests that, over time, firms that report more conservatively 
experience higher levels of co-movement.  
To formally test whether bonds of firms exhibiting higher degrees of accounting 
conservatism co-move more with their respective equities, I augment the baseline model (model 
(5)) as follows:  
ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ ൅ ߚଶܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠൅ߚଷܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤
൅ ߚସܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ ൅෍ܶ݅݉݁	ܨ݅ݔ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ
൅	ߝ௝,௠, 
(6)
where ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ is firm ݅’s proxy for accounting conservatism at the end of fiscal quarter ݍ and 
is computed as described in Section 3.3; and ܶ݅݉݁	ܨ݅ݔ݁݀	ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ are year-month fixed effects 
intended to capture unobservable characteristics that are likely to affect corporate bond returns 
over time.  All other variables are as previously defined. 
Note that, while one should expect a positive association between changes in conservatism 
and bond returns (as prior studies, e.g., Ahmed et al. (2002), show that conservatism reduces the 
cost of debt capital), the expected sign on the coefficient capturing the association between the 
level of conservatism (ߚଷ) and bond returns is theoretically unclear. Accordingly, I make no 
prediction for the sign of ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤. 
The coefficient ߚସ on the interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ is the main 
coefficient of interest. ߚସ captures the incremental effect of accounting conservatism on co-
movement. A positive and significant ߚସ would suggest that conservative firms exhibit on 
average stronger stock-bond return co-movement. 
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Table 2, Panel B reports regression results for the estimation of model (6). Column (1) 
shows that the interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ is positive and statistically 
significant for the full sample of bonds providing empirical support for H1.  
A concern with this type of analysis is that the demand for conservatism may be higher for 
firms closer to financial distress. Absent the effect of conservatism, these firms should exhibit 
higher co-movement as the equity option is more likely to be in-the-money. To address this 
concern, in columns (2) to (8) I re-estimate model (6) within each rating group.  The fact that ߚସ 
remains positive and significant across several of these rating groups, despite firms within each 
rating group being relatively homogeneous with regards to credit quality, provides reassurance 
that my findings are not simply driven by the fact that probability of distress simultaneously 
drives co-movement and demand for conservatism.14 In Section 4.4, I discuss other empirical 
strategies that I employ to address this issue. 
Moreover, the extent to which conservatism influences co-movement varies, as expected, 
with firm credit quality. The coefficient on the interaction term, in fact, monotonically increases 
as credit quality deteriorates (column (2) to (8)). The p-value of a χ2-test (0.080) confirms that 
the difference in the coefficients for the interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	across 
AAA-rated (column (2)) and CCC-rated (column (8)) bonds is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
In terms of economic magnitude, for the average bond, one standard deviation increase in 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ is associated with an 87.8% increase in stock-bond return co-movement relative to its 
average value. This effect is even more pronounced for speculative bonds. For CCC-rated bond 
                                                 
14 However, this possibility cannot be entirely excluded. 
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issues, one standard deviation increase in ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ is associated with a 108.3% increase in 
stock-bond return co-movement movement relative to its average value. 
 
4.3. Bond-, Firm- and Macro-level Factors 
I next consider the impact of other factors that previous research has shown to be relevant 
predictors of corporate bond returns (e.g., Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001; Schaefer and Strebulaev, 
2008) on the association between conservatism and stock-bond return co-movement. To this end, 
I estimate an alternative version of model (6) that includes a vector of bond-level controls 
(ܤ݋݊݀	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௝,௠|௬), a vector of firm-level controls (ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௤|௬), a vector of macro-
level controls (ܯܽܿݎ݋	ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௠). 
Among the bond-level controls, I include a proxy for time to maturity (ܮ݊ሺ1 ൅
ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ሻ), bond credit rating (ܮ݊ሺܤ݋݊݀	ܴܽݐ݅݊݃௝,௬ሻ), bond age (ܮ݊ሺܤ݋݊݀	ܣ݃݁௝,௬ሻ), a proxy 
for liquidity (ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀	ܫ݈݈݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௝,௠), and a measure of duration (ܯܽܿܽݑ݈ܽݕ	ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௝,௬). 
Among the firm-level controls, I include a proxy for default risk (ܧܦܨ௜,௠), firm size 
(ܮ݊ሺܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ሻ), leverage (ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤), and asset volatility (ܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௠). 
Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001), Elton et al. (2001), and Schaefer and Strebulaev (2008), 
I include the following macro-level controls: the change in term structure (∆ܶ݁ݎ݉	ܵݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁௠), 
the return of the S&P 500 index (ܵ&ܲ	500	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௠), the change in VIX index (∆	ܸܫܺ௠), and 
the Fama-French ܵܯܤ௠, ܪܯܮ௠, and ܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉௠ factors.15 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 3. Among the bond-level controls 
(column (1)), the coefficient on ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀	ܫ݈݈݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௝,௠ is negative and statistically significant, 
and the coefficient on  ܯܽܿܽݑ݈ܽݕ	ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௝,௬ is positive and statistically significant. This is 
                                                 
15 A detailed presentation of the variable definitions is included in the Appendix. 
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consistent with prior evidence suggesting that liquidity and duration are priced risk factors in 
credit markets. Among the firm-level controls (column (2)), the coefficients on 
ܮ݊൫ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤൯, ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤, and ܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௠ are all positive and statistically 
significant. Again, these results are in line with those of prior studies (Correia et al., 2012; 
Correia et al., 2015) and show that smaller and riskier firms exhibit on average higher returns. As 
for the macro-level controls, I find that ∆ܶ݁ݎ݉	ܵݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁௠ and ܪܯܮ௠ exhibit a negative and 
statistically significant association with bond returns, whereas ܵܯܤ௠ is positive and statistically 
significant (column (3)). These results are again in line with expectations based on prior research 
(Fama and French, 1993; Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). I report p-values from F-tests that 
strongly reject the hypothesis that the coefficients on bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls are 
equal to zero. The effect of conservatism on co-movement remains statistically and economically 
significant even after including the three sets of controls simultaneously (the coefficient on the 
interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ in column (4) is 0.229). 
 
4.4. The Role of Expected Default Frequency and Time to Maturity 
To test my H2 which predicts a stronger effect of conservatism on stock-bond return co-
movement when default risk is higher, I augment model (6) by including a proxy for one-month-
ahead expected default probability (ܧܦܨ௜,௠) from the Merton (1974) model computed following 
the approach described in Bharath and Shumway (2008). Also, to capture the incremental effect 
of default risk on co-movement, I interact ܧܦܨ௜,௠ with ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠. A detailed 
description of the ܧܦܨ௜,௠ variable construction is presented in the Appendix. 
Table 4 reports the results of this test and shows that a higher default probability is 
associated, as expected, with stronger co-movement (column (1)). The effect of conservatism on 
25 
 
co-movement remains statistically and economically significant (albeit smaller), even after 
controlling for default risk (the coefficient on the interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	is 0.121). This provides additional reassurance that the documented higher 
co-movement for firms with greater degrees of conservatism is not simply driven by higher 
demand for conservatism in firms where the equity option is more likely to be in-the-money. In 
columns (2) and (3), I respectively split the sample into low and high default risk sub-samples 
based on the median value of ܧܦܨ௜,௠. In line with expectations, I document a stronger effect of 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ on co-movement when credit risk is higher (high ܧܦܨ௜,௠ sub-sample).16 
To test my H3 which predicts a stronger effect of conservatism on stock-bond return co-
movement when bond maturity is longer, I augment model (6) by including a proxy for time to 
maturity (ܮ݊ሺ1 ൅ ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ሻ) and its interaction with ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠. The Merton (1974) 
model predicts that returns of more mature bonds should exhibit higher sensitivities to equity 
returns (i.e., larger hedge ratios). My regression results (column (4)) confirm this prediction with 
the coefficient on the interaction term (ܮ݊ሺ1 ൅ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ሻ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠) being 
positive and statistically significant. 
After controlling for differences in maturity structures, the effect of conservatism on co-
movement remains statistically and economically significant (the coefficient on the interaction 
term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	is 0.198). Moreover, as shown in columns (5) and (6) 
respectively, the effect of conservatism is stronger for bonds with longer maturities.17 
 
                                                 
16 The p-value of a χ2-test (0.000) confirms that the difference in the coefficients for the interaction term 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ ௜݁,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	across low ܧܦܨ and high ܧܦܨ bonds is statistically significant at conventional 
levels. 
17 The p-value of a χ2-test (0.052) confirms that the difference in the coefficients for the interaction term 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ ௜݁,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	across low ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ and high ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ bonds is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
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4.5.  Stock-Bond Return Co-Movement and Bond Covenants  
To test my H4 which predicts that conservatism and bond covenants jointly increase stock-
bond return co-movement, I limit my sample to bonds for which the Mergent FISD database 
provides information on covenant provisions. The sample size, accordingly, decreases to 35,208 
bond-month observations. 
To capture the stringency of covenant requirements, I follow prior research (e.g., Nikolaev, 
2010; Christensen and Nikolaev, 2012; Amiraslani et al., 2015; Bradley and Roberts, 2015) and 
build an overall covenant intensity score (ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ	ܫ݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ௝) based on the total number of 
covenants in the borrowing firm’s bond contract. Moreover, I construct two additional scores: (i) 
ܣܿܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݅݊݃	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝ which captures contractual constraints imposed on the borrowing firms 
on the basis of accounting and control measures; and (ii) ܨܫܲ	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝	 which tracks the 
number of covenants associated with issuers’ financing, investment, and payout restrictions. A 
detailed presentation of these variables’ definitions is provided in the Appendix. 
Table 5 presents the results of the analysis where model specifications include the proxy 
for overall covenant intensity (column (1)), the proxy for the presence of accounting covenants 
(column (2)), and the proxy for covenants related to the issuer’s financing, investment, and 
payout activities (column (3)), as well as their respective interactions with ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠. 
The model includes, but coefficients are not reported for parsimony, the bond-, firm-, and macro-
level controls described in Section 4.3 and year-month fixed effects. As expected, I observe a 
positive and significant coefficient on the interaction terms with ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ for all 
covenant scores. This is consistent with the idea that covenants act as a control mechanisms 
aligning the interest of shareholders and bondholders (Billett et al., 2007; Chava and Roberts, 
2008; Nini et al., 2009; Nikolaev, 2010; Christensen et al., 2016). Note that the effect of 
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conservatism on co-movement remains statistically and economically significant even after 
controlling for the effects of covenants. This result suggests that covenants and accounting 
conservatism jointly affect the extent of stock-bond return co-movement.18 
 
4.6. Mitigating Endogeneity Concerns 
So far, I have documented a strong positive association between accounting conservatism 
and the extent of stock-bond return co-movement. However, my findings are potentially subject 
to two types of endogeneity concerns, and namely: (i) a correlated omitted variable problem; and 
(ii) a reverse causality issue running from co-movement to conservatism.  
To mitigate the concern that my findings could be driven by correlated omitted variables, I 
have tested for the inclusion of an extensive set of bond-, firm-, and macro-level control 
variables. In the following sub-sections, I perform a series of additional tests to alleviate the 
concerns that the documented relation between conservatism and co-movement could suffer 
from an endogeneity bias. Additionally, to account for potential endogeneity driven by reverse 
causality, I evaluate the impact of past stock-bond return co-movement on accounting 
conservatism by implementing a panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) approach. Results of this 
specific analysis are presented in the Appendix. 
While each of the tests conducted could be individually subject to criticism, and an 
endogeneity can never be fully ruled out, consistent evidence across multiple tests could jointly 
provide reasonable reassurance of a causal relationship. 
 
                                                 
18 In additional (untabulated) tests, I analyze “finer” covenants partitions by constructing scores for performance and 
capital covenants (following Christensen and Nikolaev (2012)), and scores for investment, financing, and payout 
covenants (following Nikolaev (2010) and Bradley and Roberts (2015)). The tenor of the findings from tests 
performed using these scores is qualitatively similar to that of the main analysis. 
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4.6.1. Two-Stages Least Squares (2-SLS) Estimation 
As the relation between accounting conservatism and stock-bond return co-movement 
could be driven by correlated omitted variables which I fail to control for in the previous 
analyses (notwithstanding the extensive set of controls employed), I use an instrumental variable 
two-stages least squares (2-SLS) regression approach to address this concern. 
 Khan and Watts (2009) document that longer investment cycle and younger firm age are 
associated with more conditional conservatism. Following an approach similar to DeFond et al. 
(2012), I instrument accounting conservatism with: (i) an increasing measure of firm investment 
cycle (ܻ݋ݑ݊݃	ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊ݕ௜,௬); and (ii) a decreasing measure of firm age 
(ܮ݋݊݃	ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ܥݕ݈ܿ݁௜,௤).19 Details on these variables’ definitions are provided in the 
Appendix.  
Table 6, Panel A presents the results for the 2-SLS estimation. The specification presented 
in columns (1) to (3) include year-month fixed effects, while, in addition to that, the 
specifications presented in columns (4) to (6) include bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls. 
In the first stage, I regress ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ on ܻ݋ݑ݊݃	ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊ݕ௜,௬ and 
ܮ݋݊݃	ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ܥݕ݈ܿ݁௜,௤ (columns (1) and (4)), as well as on their respective interactions with 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (columns (2) and (5)). Following the approach described by Larcker and 
Rusticus (2010), I test the validity of the instruments by conducting partial F-tests on the first 
stage regressions where all of the exogenous variables are included. The partial F-statistics of the 
instruments range from 9.96 to 114.54 which is above the thresholds recommended by Stock et 
al. (2002). Therefore, I conclude that the selected instruments are highly correlated with my 
                                                 
19 While DeFond et al. (2012) use firm age and a decreasing measure of firm investment cycle as instruments, for 
expositional reasons I use ܻ݋ݑ݊݃	ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊ݕ௜,௬ and ܮ݋݊݃	ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ܥݕ݈ܿ ௜݁,௤. This is because the expected signs 
on their coefficients and those of their interactions with ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ defined this way make more intuitive 
sense in my setting. 
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accounting conservatism measure. Columns (3) and (6) present the results from the second stage. 
The coefficient on the fitted interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ remains positive 
and significant (in both columns (3) and (6)) and close in magnitude to that reported in the main 
analysis. The tests for the over-identifying restrictions are encouraging in the sense that they fail 
to reject the hypothesis that the instruments are exogenous (p-values are 0.495 and 0.163 in 
column (3) and columns (6), respectively). Overall, these results suggest that the documented 
relation between accounting conservatism and co-movement is not likely to be affected by 
endogeneity bias. 
 
4.6.2. Controlling  for Audit Litigation Risk and Firm Litigation Risk 
Another potential concern with the relation between conservatism and stock-bond return 
co-movement is that when a firm is close to financial distress and stock-bond return co-
movement is high, bondholders may influence the timeliness of the recognition of economic 
losses in earnings through implicit threats that would result in increased litigation risk. The fact 
that the coefficient on ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ remains significant when I estimate 
model (6) within rating buckets (Table 2, Panel B) or control for 	
ܧܦܨ௜,௠ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (Table 4) partially addresses this issue. To further mitigate this 
concern, the model specification presented in Table 6, Panel B is augmented with two proxies 
aimed at capturing changes in litigation risk and their respective interactions with 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠. Following the approach of Qiang (2007), ܣݑ݀݅ݐ	ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௬ captures 
the extent of potential auditor liability and is based on whether or not the firm is audit by a big4 
auditor, whereas ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௬ is meant to capture litigation risk beyond increased 
auditor liability and is based on the industry membership proxy developed by Francis et al. 
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(1994). The results presented in columns (1) to (6) of Table 6, Panel B show that, even after 
controlling for the extent of litigation risk, the coefficient on the interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ is positive and significant. Overall, these findings seem to suggest that the 
relation between accounting conservatism and stock-bond return co-movement obtains even after 
controlling for variation in litigation risk. 
 
4.6.3. Firm Fixed Effects Estimation 
To further address the possibility that unobserved firm-level omitted variables could be 
driving my results, I implement a firm fixed effects estimation. The firm fixed effects estimation 
approach is widely used in empirical studies to control for cross-sectional heterogeneity and to 
mitigate endogeneity issues. To be effective, firm-fixed effect models requires the dependent 
variable to display sufficient within-firm variation over time (Wooldridge 2000), which is 
certainly the case for monthly bond returns. 
Table 6, Panel C presents the results of this analysis. Once again, the coefficient on the 
interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ is positive and significant. 
Although unobservable confounding factors and reverse causality are always hard to rule 
out, taken together, results from the battery of tests conducted to mitigate potential endogeneity 
concerns seem to reject the hypothesis that my findings are driven by these issues. 
 
5. Robustness Tests 
5.1. Alternative Measures of Accounting Conservatism  
I perform a number of additional tests to ensure that my findings are robust to alternative 
proxies for accounting conservatism. Specifically, I show that the empirical results documented 
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in the previous sections are qualitatively similar when using: (i) the Basu (1997) asymmetric 
timeliness (ܤܽݏݑ); and (ii) the Callen et al. (2010) conservatism ratio (ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ). 
To construct the asymmetric timeliness proxy, I follow prior literature (Basu, 1997; Pope 
and Walker, 1999; Givoly and Hayn, 2000; Garcia Lara et al., 2005) and use the following firm-
specific earnings-returns regression: 
ܧ௜,௤ ൌ ߙ଴,௜ ൅ ߙଵ,௜ܦܴ௜,௤ ൅ ߚ଴,௜ܴ௜,௤ ൅ ߚଵ,௜ܴ௜,௤ ൈ ܦܴ௜,௤ ൅ ߝ௜,௤, (7)
where ܧ௜,௤	is firm ݅’s quarterly net income before extraordinary items deflated by market value of 
equity at the beginning of fiscal quarter ݍ; ܴ௜,௤	is  firm ݅’s three months buy and hold return 
ending one month after the end of fiscal quarter ݍ; ܦܴ௜,௤	is an indicator variable taking the value 
of one if ܴ௜,௤ ൏ 0 and zero otherwise. Following Francis et al. (2004) and Heflin et al. (2015), 
model (7) is estimated on a firm- and quarter-specific basis, using rolling 24-quarter windows.20 
The conservatism measure from this regression, ܤܽݏݑ, equals the coefficient ߚଵ,௜	and captures 
the asymmetric timeliness of earnings to bad news relative to good news.  
The Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness measure has at least two limitations 
(Roychowdhury and Watts, 2007). First, it does not capture the cumulative effect of 
conservatism across all previous periods. Second, when measured at the firm-level, the construct 
is potentially subject to downward bias. As an further robustness test, I therefore employ an 
additional conservatism proxy: the conservatism ratio (ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ) developed by Callen et al. 
(2010). Details on the construction of the Callen et al. (2010) conservatism ratio are presented in 
the Appendix. 
Table 7 reports the results of the additional tests conducted using the alternative 
conservatism proxies described above. Consistent with the previously reported evidence, I again 
                                                 
20 Francis et al. (2004) and Heflin et al. (2015) adopt a time-series approach to estimate conservatism. However, 
while Francis et al. (2004) estimate their measure using annual data, Heflin et al. (2015) utilize quarterly data. 
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find that stock-bond return co-movement is increasing in the degree of accounting conservatism 
as captured by both the Basu (1997) measure (ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤) and the Callen et al. (2010) conservatism 
ratio (ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤). The coefficients on the interaction terms (ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ in 
columns (1) and (2) and ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠  in columns (3) and (4)) are, in fact, 
positive and significant across all specifications. 
 
5.2. Controlling  for the Inputs to the C-Score Measure  
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ is a time-varying measure of accounting conservatism and its cross-sectional 
variation is driven firm-specific characteristics (ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤, ܯܶܤ௜,௤, and ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤) that are inputs 
to the measure calculation. To alleviate the concern that the identified relation between 
conservatism and stock-bond return co-movement could be driven by differences in these firm-
specific characteristics, I perform an additional test. Specifically, in the model specifications 
presented in Table 8, I further control for the main effects of the inputs to ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ as well as 
for their respective interactions with ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ both individually (columns (1) to (3)) 
and simultaneously (column (4)). These are variables that could be simultaneously correlated 
with conservatism and co-movement and hence drive the documented association. Across all the 
specifications, my main coefficient of interest ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ remains positive 
and significant. 
 
5.3. Representative Bond Analysis 
As corporate issuers often issue multiple bonds, treating each bond as a separate 
observation has potential shortcomings (Bessembinder et al., 2009). First, a bond-level approach 
violates the assumption that sample observations are independent. Second, firms with multiple 
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bonds receive a larger weight relative to firms with a single bond. While in the previous analyses 
I correct for these problems by clustering standard errors by firm and year-month, in this section 
I perform an additional test using a parsimonious approach based on the selection of a 
representative bond for each firm in the sample. To this end, I follow the filters described in 
Haesen et al. (2013) so as to identify a representative bond for each firm every month for my 
sample period.  
The idea behind the selection criteria for the representative bond is to identify a sub-sample 
of liquid and cross-sectionally comparable bonds. To do this, I select representative bonds based 
on: (i) seniority; (ii) maturity; (iii) age; and (iv) size. 
I implement the following filters sequentially. First, I filter bonds on the basis of seniority 
by selecting only bonds that correspond to the largest rating of the issuer. I compute the number 
of bonds outstanding for each rating bucket and then keep only those bonds that belong to the 
rating bucket with the largest fraction of debt outstanding. Second, I filter bonds on the basis of 
maturity as follows: If the issuer has bonds with time to maturity between 5 and 15 years, I drop 
all other bonds for that firm from the sample; Alternatively, I keep all bonds in the sample. 
Third, I filter bonds on the basis of time since issuance by removing all bonds that are older than 
two years if the firm has any bonds that are two years old at most. Alternatively, I keep all bonds 
in the sample. Lastly, I filter all the remaining bonds on basis of size by selecting for each firm 
the bond with the largest amount outstanding. 
Following the selection criteria above, the sample size decreases from the original 48,597 
to 15,438 bond-month observations. Table 9 reports the results of the representative bond 
analysis. In line with the findings from the main analysis, I find that, even for a sub-sample of 
representative bonds, stock-bond return co-movement increases with the degree of accounting 
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conservatism across all specifications also when using alternative conservatism constructs and 
different sets of control variables. 
 
6. Conclusion 
I examine the extent to which reporting conservatism, a fundamental property of 
accounting information, affects the co-movement of stock and bond returns.  
While prior research has focused on stock-bond return correlation at the aggregate level 
(Yang et al., 2009), evidence on the co-movement between stocks and bonds issued by the same 
firm is relatively scarce. In theory, while stock-bond return correlation is on average positive, it 
becomes weaker when shareholders have incentives to expropriate bondholders’ wealth by 
engaging in risk shifting activities (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
The aggregate correlation between stock and bond returns is a central input for asset 
allocation decisions as it measures the diversification benefits of bonds, and it is helpful in 
designing portfolio strategies to hedge common exposures across equity and credit markets 
(Markowitz, 1952; Sharpe, 1964). Similarly, firm-specific stock-bond return co-movement is 
important for asset allocation decisions. This is because wealth transfers from bondholders to 
shareholders are likely correlated across firms in the economy (especially in periods of economic 
downturn), and thus understanding how accounting conservatism relates to firm-level co-
movement of equity and bond returns is of importance for portfolio asset allocation. 
I hypothesize and provide evidence that accounting conservatism increases the extent of 
stock-bond return co-movement. Firms that choose to report conservatively provide a timely and 
credible signal to bondholders. This is in line with the conjecture that conservative financial 
reports improve bondholders’ ability to monitor managerial actions and effectively intervene if 
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needed. Furthermore, I find that the effect of accounting conservatism on stock-bond return co-
movement is more pronounced when default risk is higher (Eisdorfer, 2008) and debt maturities 
are longer (Leland and Toft, 1996). Finally, in line with findings from prior research (Nikolaev, 
2010; Tan, 2013), I show that conservatism and bond covenants jointly increase stock-bond 
return co-movement. 
To mitigate the concern that my results could be driven by omitted correlated variables, or 
suffer from a reverse causality bias, I perform a number of additional tests all suggesting that 
endogeneity does not seem to affect my findings. While each of these tests could be individually 
subject to criticism, the fact that all converge towards the same evidence supports the idea of a 
causal relation between conservatism and stock-bond return correlation. 
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Appendix 
 
A. Variable Definitions 
Variable  Description 
  
Bond-level variables:  
ܨܽܿ݁	ܸ݈ܽݑ ௝݁ Face value (in U.S. $ Mil.) of bond ݆ at the time of issuance (Source: 
Mergent FISD).  
ܤ݋݊݀	ܣ݃݁௝,௬ Number of years (ݕ) since bond ݆’s issuance (Source: Mergent FISD). 
ܥ݋ݑ݌݋݊௝ Bond ݆’s percentage coupon rate (Source: Mergent FISD). 
ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ Time to maturity for bond ݆ computed as the number of years (ݕ) 
remaining until the bond is redeemed (Source: Mergent FISD). 
ܯܽܿܽݑ݈ܽݕ	ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௝,௬ Bond ݆’s Macaulay duration calculated each year ݕ as the weighted 
average term to maturity of the cash flows. The Macaulay duration is 
calculated as follows: 
ܯܽܿܽݑ݈ܽݕ	ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௝,௬ ൌ ෍ ݐ௝,௞
ܲ ௝ܸ,௞
௝ܸ
,
௡
௞ୀଵ
 
where ݇ indexes the cash flows; ܲ ௝ܸ,௞	is the present value of the the ݇th 
cash flow payment from bond ݆; ݐ௝,௞ is the time in years (ݕ) until the 
payment will be received; and ௝ܸ is the present value of all future cash 
payments from the bond (Source: Mergent FISD). 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܴܽݐ݅݊݃௝,௬ Numerically-coded (e.g., CCC=1, ... AAA=21) S&P credit rating for bond ݆ in year ݕ. If the S&P bond rating is missing, the Moody’s bond rating is 
used instead. If S&P and Moody’s bond ratings are both missing, the Fitch 
bond rating is used instead (Source: Mergent FISD).  
ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀	ܫ݈݈݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௝,௠ Bond ݆’s Amihud (2002) illiquidity score calculated at the end of each 
month ݉ by first calculating a daily Amihud (2002) score and then taking 
the median across days with a non-zero score. The daily score 
(ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀	ܫ݈݈݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௝,ௗ) is calculated as follows: 
ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀	ܫ݈݈݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௝,ௗ ൌ 1ܰ෍
หݎ௣,௤ห
ܳ௣ ,
ே
 
where ܰ is the number of trades for bond ݆ in day ݀; ݎ௣,௤ is the (intraday) 
return between consecutive trades ݌ and ݍ; and ܳ௣ is the dollar par volume 
for trade ݌. The score is normalized to vary between zero and one (Source: 
FINRA TRACE).  
ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ	ܫ݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ௝ Overall covenant intensity score based on the total number of accounting, 
financing, investment and payout covenants in bond ݆’s contract. The 
definitions are based on the classifications by Bradley and Roberts (2015), 
Nikolaev (2010), Christensen and Nikolaev (2012), and Amiraslani et al. 
(2015). The score is normalized to vary between zero and one (Source: 
Mergent FISD). 
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Variable  Description 
  
Bond-level variables:  
ܣܿܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݅݊݃	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝  Accounting covenant intensity score capturing the number of covenants in 
bond ݆’s contract based on the issuer’s accounting numbers. Accounting 
covenants are defined following the classification by Christensen and 
Nikolaev (2012) and include both capital covenants and performance 
covenants. The score is normalized to vary between zero and one (Source: 
Mergent FISD).  
ܨܫܲ	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝ Financing, investment and payout covenant intensity score based on the 
number of covenants in bond ݆’s contract restricting the issuer’s financing, 
investment and payout activities. The classification follows the approach 
by Nikolaev (2010) and Bradley and Roberts (2015). The score is 
normalized to vary between zero and one (Source: Mergent FISD). 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ Bond ݆’s monthly buy-and-hold adjusted bond return computed over 
month ݉ as follows: 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ ൌ ቌ ௝ܲ,௠
൅ ܣܫ௝,௠ ൅ ܫ௝,௠ ܥ௝ܰ
௝ܲ,௠ିଵ ൅ ܣܫ௝,௠ିଵ െ 1ቍ െ ݎ ௠݂
ଵ௠, 
where ௝ܲ,௠	is the flat price of bond ݆ at the end on month ݉; ܣܫ௝,௠ is the 
accrued interest accumulated from the previous coupon payment; ܥ௝ is the 
annual coupon rate; ܰ is the coupon frequency per year; ܫ௝,௠ is an 
indicator function taking the value of one is the coupon is due between 
month, and zero otherwise; and ݎ ௠݂ଵ௠ is the return on one-month treasury 
bill up to month ݉ (Source: FINRA TRACE). 
  
Conservatism measures:  
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ Firm-quarter-specific measure of accounting conservatism for firm ݅ at the 
end of fiscal quarter ݍ developed by Khan and Watts (2009). It measures 
the incremental timeliness of earnings to bad news relative to good news 
(Source: Compustat and CRSP). 
ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ Firm-quarter-specific measure of accounting conservatism for firm ݅ at the 
end of fiscal quarter ݍ developed by Callen et al. (2010). The measure is 
computed as the ratio of current earnings shocks to earnings news. Current 
earnings shocks and earnings news are estimated based on a vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model with three state variables consisting of log of 
stock returns, log of one plus return on equity, and log of book-to-market 
ratio (Source: Compustat and CRSP). 
ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤ Firm-quarter-specific measure of accounting conservatism for firm ݅ at the 
end of fiscal quarter ݍ developed by Basu (1997). The measure captures 
the incremental timely loss recognition and is computed by estimating 
firm-specific rolling regressions following the approach by Francis et al. 
(2004) and Heflin et al. (2015) (Source: Compustat and CRSP). 
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Variable  Description 
  
Firm-level variables:  
ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ Market capitalization (U.S. $ Mil.) for firm ݅ at the end of fiscal quarter ݍ 
(Source: Compustat). 
ܯܶܤ௜,௤ Market to book ratio for firm ݅ at the end of the fiscal quarter ݍ. Market to 
book is computed as the ratio of market value of equity to book value of 
equity for firm ݅ at the end of fiscal quarter ݍ (Source: Compustat and 
CRSP). 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤ Market leverage for firm ݅ at the end of the fiscal quarter ݍ. Market 
leverage is computed as the ratio of long-term debt to the sum of long-
term debt to the market value of equity (Source: Compustat and CRSP). 
ܧܦܨ௜,௠ One-month-ahead expected default probability from the Merton (1974) 
model for firm ݅, computed following the approach by Bharath and 
Shumway (2008) as follows: 
ܧܦܨ௜,௠ ൌ 			ࣨ
ۉ
ۈ
ۇെ൮
݈݊ ൬ ௜ܸ,௠ܨ௜,௠൰ ൅ ቀߤ௜,௠ െ 0.5ߪ௏೔,೘
ଶ ቁܶ
ߪ௏೔,೘√ܶ
൲
ی
ۋ
ۊ, 
where ࣨሺ∙ሻ is the cumulative standard normal distribution function; ௜ܸ,௠ 
is the total value of firm ݅ at the end of month ݉; ܨ௜,௠ is the face value of 
firm ݅’s debt (short-term debt plus one-half long-term debt) at the end of 
month ݉; ߤ௜,௠ is the expected continuously compounded return on ௜ܸ,௠; 
ߪ௏೔,೘is the volatility of firm ݅’s value; and ܶ is equal to one (Source: 
Compustat and CRSP). 
ܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௠ Monthly estimate of the volatility of firm ݅’s assets (firm value) from the 
Merton (1974) model calculated following Bharath and Shumway (2008) 
(Source: Compustat and CRSP). 
ܣݑ݀݅ݐ	ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௬ Audit litigation risk proxy of firm ݅ in year ݕ. Following the approach of 
Qiang (2007), the variable takes the value of one if the firm is audited by a 
big four auditor, and zero otherwise. 
ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴ݅ݏ݇௜  Firm litigation risk proxy of firm ݅. Following the approach of Francis, 
Philbrick and Schipper (1994), the variable takes the value of one if the 
firm is in the biotech (SIC codes 2833-2836 and 8731-8734), computer 
(3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics (3600-3674), or retail (5200-
5961) industry, and zero otherwise. 
ܻ݋ݑ݊݃	ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊ݕ௜,௬ Natural logarithm of one plus firm age, multiplied by negative one. Firm ݅’s age is computed each year ݕ as the difference between the first year 
when the firm appears in CRSP and the current year (Source: CRSP). 
ܮ݋݊݃	ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ܥݕ݈ܿ݁௜,௤ Natural logarithm of investment cycle, multiplied by negative one. Firm ݅’s investment cycle is computed each quarter ݍ as depreciation expense 
divided by lagged total assets (Source: Compustat). 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ Monthly buy-and-hold adjusted equity return for firm ݅ over month ݉ 
defined as the monthly buy-and-hold raw  equity return minus the return 
the monthly on one-month treasury bill (Source: CRSP). 
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Macro-level variables:  
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ Monthly buy-and-hold adjusted treasury return matched to the respective 
bond ݆ based on maturity. The monthly buy-and-hold adjusted treasury 
return is defined as the monthly buy-and-hold raw treasury return minus 
the return the monthly on one-month treasury bill (Source: CRSP). 
∆ܶ݁ݎ݉	ܵݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁௠ Monthly change in term structure computed as the change in the ten-year 
minus two-year yield spread on U.S. treasury bonds (Source:  Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System). 
ܵ&ܲ	500	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௠ Monthly return on the S&P 500 index calculated over month ݉ (Source: 
CRSP). 
∆	ܸܫܺ௠ Monthly change in the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) VIX 
Index of implied volatility of options on the S&P 100 index at the end of 
month ݉ (Source: Chicago Board Options Exchange). 
ܵܯܤ௠ Fama-French ‘Small Minus Big’ monthly mimicking factor portfolio 
return to the size factor at the end of month ݉ (Source: Kenneth French’s 
website at: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).
ܪܯܮ௠ Fama-French ‘High Minus Low’ monthly mimicking factor portfolio 
return to the value factor at the end of month ݉ (Source: Kenneth French’s 
website at: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).
ܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉௠ Fama-French ‘Momentum’ monthly factor based on the average return on 
the two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two 
low prior return portfolios at the end of month ݉ (Source: Kenneth 
French’s website at: 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html).
 
 
B. Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) Estimation 
To account for potential endogeneity driven by reverse causality, I evaluate the impact of 
past stock-bond return co-movement on accounting conservatism by implementing a panel 
vector autoregressive (PVAR) approach, a technique  typically used in macroeconometrics 
(Holtz-Eakin et al., 1988).21 I thus estimate the following three-equation reduced-form model 
                                                 
21 The PVAR approach combines together the traditional vector autoregression (VAR) approach with a panel-data 
approach. While the first approach treats all variables in the VAR system as endogenous, the latter allows to control 
for unobservable heterogeneity. Combined, the two approaches are useful to disentangle the impact of exogenous 
shocks onto the VAR system. 
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with a General Method of Moments (GMM) approach. The model examines the causal relation 
between stock-bond return co-movement and conservatism, allowing co-movement to affect 
conservatism over time and vice versa: 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ൅ߚଶܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ିଵ
൅ ߚଷܥ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ିଵ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ ൅ ߚସܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௠ିଵ
൅ ߚହܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ ൅෍ܶ݅݉݁ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߝ௝,௠, 
 
(A1a)
ܥ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ൅ߚଶܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ିଵ
൅ ߚଷܥ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ିଵ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ ൅ ߚସܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௠ିଵ
൅ ߚହܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௠ ൅෍ܶ݅݉݁ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߝ௝,௠, 
 
(A1b)
ܥ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠
ൌ ߚ଴ ൅ ߚଵܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ൅ߚଶܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ିଵ
൅ ߚଷܥ_ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ିଵ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ ൅ ߚସܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ
൅ ߚହܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௠ ൅෍ܶ݅݉݁ ܨ݅ݔ݁݀ ܧ݂݂݁ܿݐݏ ൅ ߝ௝,௠. 
(A1c)
Table A.1 reports the results of this analysis. All specifications (columns (1) to (6)) include 
year-month fixed effects. The specifications presented in columns (4) to (6) also include bond-, 
firm-, and macro-level controls. The effect of past conservatism on current co-movement is 
captured by the coefficient on the interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ିଵ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ in 
columns (1) and (4) which is positive and significant, whereas the effect of past co-movement on 
current levels of conservatism (i.e., reverse causality) is captured by the coefficient on 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ିଵ in columns (3) and (6) which is positive but insignificant. Granger causality 
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tests confirm that while past co-movement does not Granger-cause current levels of 
conservatism, past conservatism Granger-causes current co-movement levels. Taken together, 
the evidence from this series of tests increases my confidence that the results I document in the 
previous sections are not driven by reverse causality. 
 
C. Callen et al. (2010) Conservatism Ratio Calculation 
The Callen et al. (2010) conservatism ratio is based on the Vuolteenaho (2002) return 
decomposition. Vuolteenaho (2002) decomposes return shocks into shocks to current and future 
dividends (or cash flows) and shocks to current and future discount rates. By replacing dividends 
with earnings in the clean surplus relation, shocks to returns can be expressed as a function of 
earnings news and discount rate news: 
ܴ௜,௤ െ 	ܧ௤ିଵ൫ܴ௜,௤൯ ൌ ܰܧ௜,௤ െ ܴܰ௜,௤, (A2)
where ܴ௜,௤ is firm ݅’s actual return over fiscal quarter ݍ; ܧ௤ିଵ൫ܴ௜,௤൯ is firm ݅’s expected return 
over fiscal quarter ݍ; ܰܧ௜,௤ is firm ݅’s earnings news at the end of fiscal quarter ݍ; and ܴܰ௜,௤ is 
firm ݅’s discount rates news at the end of fiscal quarter ݍ.  
The Callen et al. (2010) conservatism measure is based on the relation between earnings 
news (ܰܧ௜,௤) and current period unexpected earnings under the assumption that accounting 
conservatism induces nonlinearities between revisions to returns and earnings innovations. 
I perform the Vuolteenaho (2002) return decomposition using a log-linear vector 
autoregressive (VAR) model consisting of the following system of equations: 
ܴ௜,௤ ൌ ߙଵܴ௤ିଵ ൅ ߙଶܴܱܧ௤ିଵ ൅ ߙଷܤܶܯ௤ିଵ ൅ ߤଵ,௤, (A3a)
ܴܱܧ௜,௤ ൌ ߚଵܴ௤ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴܱܧ௤ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܤܶܯ௤ିଵ ൅ ߤଶ,௤, (A3b)
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ܤܶܯ௜,௤ ൌ ߛଵܴ௤ିଵ ൅ ߛଶܴܱܧ௧ିଵ ൅ ߛଷܤܶܯ௤ିଵ ൅ ߤଷ,௤, (A3c)
where ܴ௜,௤	is the natural logarithm of one plus firm ݅’s three months buy and hold return ending 
one month after the end of fiscal quarter ݍ minus the natural logarithm of one plus the annualized 
three-month treasury bill rate; ܴܱܧ௜,௤ is the natural logarithm of one plus firm ݅’s return on 
equity at the end of fiscal quarter ݍ minus the natural logarithm of one plus the annualized three-
month treasury bill rate; ܤܶܯ௜,௤ is the natural logarithm of one plus firm ݅’s book to market at 
the end of fiscal quarter ݍ minus the natural logarithm of one plus the annualized three-month 
treasury bill rate.22 Callen et al. (2010) follow Vuolteenaho (2002) and use the VAR matrix of 
estimated coefficients from the system of equations above (i.e., equations (A3a), (A3b), and 
(A3c)) and the vectors of residuals ߤ௜,௤, to derive unexpected shock to returns (ܴ௜,௤ െ ܧ௤ିଵ൫ܴ௤൯), 
discount rate news (ܴܰ௜,௤), and earnings news (ܰܧ௜,௤) as follows: 
ܴ௜,௤ െ ܧ௤ିଵ൫ܴ௤൯ ൌ ߤଵ,௤, (A4a)
ܴܰ௜,௤ ൌ ݁ଵ′ߩܣሺܫ െ ߩܣሻିଵߤ௜,௤, (A4b)
ܰܧ௜,௤ ൌ ݁ଶ′ߩܣሺܫ െ ߩܣሻିଵߤ௜,௤, (A4c)
Finally, I compute the Callen et al. (2010) conservatism ratio (	ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤) as follows: 
	ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ ൌ 	 ߤଶ,௤ܰܧ௜,௤. (A5)
	ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤	captures the asymmetric recognition of losses relative to gains. In the case of 
adverse earnings shocks, a higher score implies that a larger proportion of the negative shock is 
reflected in current period earnings.23 
                                                 
22 Following Callen et al. (2010), the VAR system is estimated for each Fama and French (1997) industry group 
using weighted least squares to control for industry effects. I demean all variables in the system and, to perform 
equal-weighting, I deflate all data in each quarterly cross-section by the number of firms in that quarter. Finally, I 
drop financial firms (SIC codes 6000-6999), observations with market value of equity below ten million U.S. 
dollars, and observations in the 1st and 99th percentile of each variable distribution. 
23 Following Callen et al. (2010), I delete firm-quarter observations with negative ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤. 
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Table A1: Panel Vector Autoregressive (PVAR) Estimation 
 
   GMM Estimation 
Dependent variables:  
 
ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠    ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤
ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ିଵ -0.218*** 0.000 0.002   -0.216*** 0.126 0.001 
   (-21.74) (0.02) (1.42)   (-20.09) (0.92) (0.62) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ିଵ -0.007 0.659*** 0.014***   0.009*** 0.615*** 0.010*** 
   (-1.25) (45.41) (5.91)   (2.79) (57.00) (4.98) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ିଵ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ 0.134*** -0.246*** -0.040*   0.072** -0.180** -0.040** 
  (4.15) (-2.89) (-1.93)   (2.37) (-2.11) (-1.97) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ିଵ 0.018*** -0.009 -0.010*** 0.017*** -0.006 -0.011*** 
(7.83) (-1.41) (-2.66) (5.69) (-0.97) (-2.78) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ -0.008 -0.068 0.003 0.044 -0.010 0.001 
  (-0.38) (-1.52) (1.06)   (1.31) (-0.21) (0.08) 
Firm controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Bond controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Granger-causality tests: 
  χ2-test p-value: ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 0.982 0.154 0.357 0.534 
  χ2-test p-value: ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 0.210 0.000 0.005 0.000 
  χ2-test p-value: ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.001 0.004 0.018 0.034 
Obs. 42,882 42,882 42,882 42,809 42,809 42,809 
This table reports results from additional analyses conducted to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. A panel vector autoregressive (PVAR) approach is used 
to capture the effect of past conservatism on current stock-bond return co-movement. All specifications include year-month fixed effects, as well as bond-, firm-, 
and macro-level controls in the specifications presented in columns (4), (5), and (6) (coefficients are not reported for parsimony). p-values from Granger-
causality χ2-tests for the coefficients on ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠	(in columns (2), (3), (5) and (6)),	ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤	(in columns (1), (3), (4) and (6)), and ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	(in columns (1), (2), (4) and (5)) are reported. GMM coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) z-scores are based on heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by firm and year-month. A detailed presentation of all variable definitions is provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Figure 1: Stock-Bond Return Co-Movement Time-Series for High versus Low Conservatism 
 
 
 
  
This figure presents a de-trended stock-bond return co-movement time-series for high (solid line) versus low (dotted line) conservatism firms. The 
time-series is based on monthly estimations of model (5). The cut-off for the high and low levels of accounting conservatism is based on median 
values of ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁. 
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A: Bond-Level Distributional Properties 
    All   AAA AA A BBB BB B C 
Bonds 1,478 30 125 516 538 180 72 17 
Bond-months 48,597 835 5,619 17,480 15,883 5,656 2,468 656 
ܨܽܿ݁	ܸ݈ܽݑ ௝݁ (U.S. $ Mil.) 
Mean 320 493 763 248 283 206 264 318 
Median 200 500 500 200 200 200 200 294 
Std. Dev. 451 597 891 292 355 150 233 273 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܣ݃݁௝,௬ 
Mean 7.948 6.196 5.687 7.950 8.464 8.559 8.591 9.284
Median 8.000 5.000 4.000 8.000 8.000 9.000 9.000 9.000 
Std. Dev. 4.261 4.152 3.874 4.537 3.888 3.976 4.244 3.970 
ܥ݋ݑ݌݋݊௝ 
Mean 6.676 5.291 5.214 6.466 6.955 7.541 7.745 8.323 
Median 6.875 5.250 5.200 6.625 7.000 7.500 7.750 7.800 
Std. Dev. 1.593 1.452 1.628 1.600 1.304 1.067 1.119 1.156 
ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ 
Mean 6.828 10.463 5.955 6.748 6.864 7.128 7.115 7.279 
Median 4.000 9.000 3.000 4.000 4.000 5.000 5.000 5.000 
Std. Dev. 6.877 7.790 6.525 6.758 7.050 6.823 6.774 6.510 
ܯܽܿܽݑ݈ܽݕ	ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௝,௬ 
Mean 4.708 6.768 4.484 4.807 4.665 4.670 4.315 4.251
Median 3.783 7.759 3.521 3.873 3.565 4.041 3.776 3.764 
Std. Dev. 3.441 3.790 3.381 3.483 3.512 3.227 3.082 2.569 
ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Mean 0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.006 0.005 
Median 0.002 0.003 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.004 0.004 0.004 
Std. Dev.   0.017   0.017 0.014 0.016 0.018 0.019 0.021 0.023 
 
Panel B: Firm-Level Distributional Properties 
Variable Firms Firm-Months Mean Std. Dev. P25 Median P75 
ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ (U.S. $ Mil.) 301 15,438 22,441 30,794 3,306 10,272 26,617 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 301 15,438 -0.012 0.072 -0.063 -0.016 0.040 
ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐ	ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤ 301 15,438 0.485 0.384 0.172 0.344 0.704 
ܧܦܨ௜,௠ 301 15,438 0.001 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௠ 301 15,438 0.248 0.080 0.178 0.236 0.311 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 301 15,438 0.011 0.061 -0.035 0.011 0.057 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the sample over the period 2002-2012. The sample selection is based on 
the following criteria: Bonds are issued by non-financial U.S. firms (SIC codes 6000-6999 are excluded) and are 
denominated in U.S. dollars; bonds are straight (i.e., bonds that are callable, puttable, exchangeable, asset-backed, 
enhanced, preferred, convertible, and with variable coupon rate are excluded), and are not privately placed under 
SEC Rule 144A. Panel A presents summary statistics for bond issues separately by S&P bond issue credit rating 
buckets. Panel B presents summary statistics for bond issuers. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 
99th percentile of their distributions. Detailed variable definitions are presented in the Appendix. 
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Table 2: Stock-Bond Return Co-Movement and Accounting Conservatism 
 
Panel A: Stock-Bond Return Co-Movement Base Model 
  Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables:   (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
All AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC 
Intercept 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 
(5.33) (4.22) (4.20) (4.28) (5.40) (6.20) (6.26) (4.40) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.023*** -0.010 0.009 -0.001 0.021*** 0.041*** 0.083*** 0.102*** 
(3.74) (-0.75) (1.16) (-0.22) (2.63) (5.31) (8.59) (3.86) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ 0.052*** 0.153** 0.061*** 0.062*** 0.047* 0.014 -0.020 0.011 
    (2.77)   (2.43) (5.55) (2.99) (1.92) (0.69) (-0.82) (0.28) 
Test for difference in ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (2)-(8) 
  χ2-test p-value: AAA=CCC 0.000 
Test for difference in ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ (2)-(8) 
  χ2-test p-value: AAA=CCC   0.055             
Obs. 48,597 835 5,619 17,480 15,883 5,656 2,468 656 
Adj. R2   0.0102 0.0353 0.0132 0.0075 0.0083 0.0209 0.0865 0.1116 
 
Panel B: The Effect of Accounting Conservatism 
    Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables:   (1)   (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
All AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC 
Intercept 0.009*** 0.020 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.010*** 0.006*** -0.001 -0.032*** 
(23.06) (0.00) (32.32) (28.86) (24.69) (5.18) (-0.90) (-8.70) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.022*** -0.007 0.018** 0.010*** 0.013** 0.018*** 0.043*** 0.036*** 
(6.63) (-0.26) (2.19) (2.60) (2.47) (4.54) (4.45) (3.56) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 0.008** 0.011 -0.000 0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.012 0.041* 
(2.30) (0.68) (-0.07) (0.32) (0.68) (-0.30) (0.88) (1.90) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠   0.234***   -0.018 0.108 0.014 0.153* 0.154** 0.023 0.510*** 
    (5.11)   (-0.09) (1.09) (0.28) (1.88) (2.07) (0.24) (2.65) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ 0.018*** 0.072** 0.028*** 0.018** 0.025** -0.009 0.004 -0.110 
(2.87) (2.07) (3.04) (2.53) (2.38) (-0.50) (0.22) (-1.42) 
Year-Month fixed effects   Yes   Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Test for difference in	ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (2)-(8) 
  χ2-test p-value: AAA=CCC   0.080             
Obs. 48,597 835 5,619 17,480 15,883 5,656 2,468 656 
Adj. R2   0.1552 0.4195 0.3279 0.1914 0.1495 0.1543 0.2035 0.3702 
This table reports regressions of corporate bond returns on equity returns, treasury returns and accounting conservatism. Panel A presents the baseline stock-bond 
co-movement model, where the extent of stock-bond return correlation is captured by the coefficient on ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠. Panel B presents the model 
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augmented with the accounting conservatism score ሺܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤). The interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	captures the incremental stock-bond 
return co-movement for conservative firms. All specifications in Panel B include year-month fixed effects (coefficients are not reported for parsimony). In Panel 
A, p-values from χ2-tests for the difference in the ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ and ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠	coefficients across bonds rated AAA (column (2)) and CCC 
(column (8)) are reported. In Panel B, the p-value from a χ2-test for the difference in the coefficient on the interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 
across bonds rated AAA (column (2)) and CCC (column (8)) is reported. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on 
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year-month. A detailed presentation of all variable definitions is provided in the Appendix. ***, 
**, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 3: Bond-, Firm- and Macro-Level Factors 
 
  Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.002* -0.007* 0.004*** -0.006* 
(1.74) (-1.88) (6.04) (-1.82) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.025*** 
(4.31) (4.47) (4.63) (4.60) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 0.019** 0.017* 0.017*** 0.017** 
(2.33) (1.76) (3.05) (2.14) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.214*** 0.218*** 0.222*** 0.229*** 
  (3.46) (3.82) (3.44) (3.65) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ 0.035* 0.036** 0.085*** 0.075*** 
(1.84) (2.08) (5.03) (4.44) 
Bond-level controls: 
ܮ݊ሺ1 ൅ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ሻ 0.000 -0.000 
(0.14) (-0.49) 
ܮ݊ሺܤ݋݊݀	ܴܽݐ݅݊݃௝,௬ሻ -0.002 -0.002 
(-0.92) (-0.98) 
ܣ݄݉݅ݑ݀	ܫ݈݈݅ݍݑ݅݀݅ݐݕ௝,௠ -0.002*** -0.002*** 
(-2.83) (-4.51) 
ܯܽܿܽݑ݈ܽݕ	ܦݑݎܽݐ݅݋݊௝,௬ 0.000*** 0.001*** 
(2.65) (3.49) 
ܮ݊ሺܤ݋݊݀	ܣ݃݁௝,௬ሻ -0.000 -0.001** 
(-0.95) (-2.20) 
Firm-level controls: 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ሻ 0.001* 0.001** 
(1.94) (1.97) 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤ 0.001* 0.001 
(1.83) (0.72) 
ܧܦܨ௜,௠ -0.020 0.095 
(-0.11) (0.52) 
ܣݏݏ݁ݐ	ܸ݋݈ܽݐ݈݅݅ݐݕ௜,௠ 0.018*** 0.014** 
(3.26) (2.51) 
Macro-level controls: 
∆ܶ݁ݎ݉	ܵݐݎݑܿݐݑݎ݁௠ -0.085*** -0.078*** 
(-3.48) (-3.28) 
ܵ&ܲ	500	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௠ 0.021 0.027 
(0.87) (1.17) 
∆	ܸܫܺ௠ 0.000 0.000 
(0.80) (0.98) 
ܵܯܤ௠ 0.060** 0.051** 
(2.28) (2.00) 
ܪܯܮ௠ -0.048* -0.041 
(-1.81) (-1.59) 
ܯ݋݉݁݊ݐݑ݉௠ -0.003 0.004 
      (-0.22) (0.28) 
Test for the inclusion of firm-level controls (1) 
  F-test p-value:  0.000 
Test for the inclusion of bond-level controls  (2) 
  F-test p-value:  0.016 
Test for the inclusion of macro-level controls  (3) 
  F-test p-value:  0.000       
Obs. 48,597 48,597 48,597 48,597 
Adj. R2 0.0301 0.0274 0.0371 0.0487 
This table reports regressions of corporate bond returns on equity returns, treasury returns and accounting 
conservatism controlling for bond-, firm-, and macro-level factors. The interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ captures the incremental stock-bond return co-movement for conservative firms. The model 
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specifications presented in columns (1), (2), and (3) include bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls, respectively. 
The model specification presented in column (4) includes bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls simultaneously. p-
values from Wald F-tests assessing that the coefficients for bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls are (respectively) 
jointly equal to zero are reported. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based 
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year-month. A detailed presentation of all variable 
definitions is provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels 
(two-tailed), respectively. 
57 
 
Table 4: The Role of Expected Default Frequency and Time to Maturity 
  
    Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  All  
Low 
ܧܦܨ௜,௠ 
High 
ܧܦܨ௜,௠  All  
Low 
ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ 
High 
ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ 
Intercept 0.009*** 0.012*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 
(18.72) (57.33) (19.17) (11.87) (23.73) (18.51) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.011*** 0.009*** 0.020*** 0.003 0.019*** 0.024*** 
(3.98) (2.75) (5.07) (0.76) (7.66) (5.23) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 0.009*** 0.004 0.008* 0.008** 0.009*** 0.005 
(2.94) (0.97) (1.92) (2.38) (3.16) (1.17) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠   0.121***   0.033 0.233***   0.198***   0.193*** 0.278*** 
    (3.88)   (0.62) (4.37)   (4.97)   (5.79) (4.22) 
ܧܦܨ௜,௠ 0.075   
(0.53)   
ܧܦܨ௜,௠ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠   8.288***               
    (5.65)               
ܮ݊ሺ1 ൅ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ሻ 0.001***   
(3.29)   
ܮ݊ሺ1 ൅ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ሻ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 
          0.009***       
              (6.17)     
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ 0.019*** 0.026*** 0.013* 0.006 0.009*** -0.015 
(2.85) (3.39) (1.82) (1.24) (2.74) (-0.98) 
Year-Month fixed effects  Yes  Yes Yes  Yes  Yes Yes 
Test for difference in ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (2)-(3) 
  χ2-test p-value: Low ܧܦܨ௜,௠=High ܧܦܨ௜,௠ 0.000 
Test for difference in ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠(5)-(6) 
  χ2-test p-value: Low ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬=Highܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬  0.052           
Obs. 48,597 24,288 24,309 48,597 26,115 22,482 
Adj. R2   0.1591 0.1905 0.1352 0.1651 0.1086 0.2319 
This table reports regressions of corporate bond returns on equity returns, treasury returns and accounting conservatism. Model 
specifications presented in columns (1) to (3) and (4) to (6) include proxies for default risk (ܧܦܨ௜,௠) and time to maturity (ܮ݊ሺ1 ൅
ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ሻ), respectively. All specifications include year-month fixed effects (coefficients are not reported for parsimony). p-
values from χ2-tests for the difference in the coefficient on the interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ across Low 
ܧܦܨ௜,௠ (column (2)) and High ܧܦܨ௜,௠ (column (3)), as well as Low ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ (column (5)) and High ܯܽݐݑݎ݅ݐݕ௝,௬ (column (6)) 
are reported. The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust 
standard errors clustered by firm and year-month. A detailed presentation of all variable definitions is provided in the Appendix. 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 5: Stock-Bond Return Co-Movement and Bond Covenants 
 
  Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) 
Intercept 0.002 0.003 0.002 
(0.95) (1.04) (0.93) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.001 0.015*** 0.003 
(0.16) (3.51) (0.25) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 0.004 0.004 0.004 
(1.18) (1.13) (1.17) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.245*** 0.245*** 0.254*** 
(4.86) (4.90) (5.10) 
ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ	ܫ݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ௝ 0.000  
(0.63)  
ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ	ܫ݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ௝ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.063***    
(2.79)    
ܣܿܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݅݊݃	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝ 0.000  
(0.07)  
ܣܿܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݅݊݃	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠   0.047***  
  (2.93)  
ܨܫܲ	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝ 0.000 
(0.77) 
ܨܫܲ	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠     0.047* 
    (1.92) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ 0.013* 0.014* 0.014* 
  (1.71) (1.75) (1.73) 
Bond controls Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 35,208 35,208 35,208 
Adj. R2 0.1874 0.1874 0.1870 
This table reports regressions of corporate bond returns on equity returns, treasury returns and accounting 
conservatism, as well as different categories of bond covenant provisions. The interaction term 	
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ captures the incremental stock-bond return co-movement for conservative firms. 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) present the base model augmented with the overall covenant intensity score 
(ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ	ܫ݊ݐ݁݊ݏ݅ݐݕ௝), the accounting covenant score (ܣܿܿ݋ݑ݊ݐ݅݊݃	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝) and the financing, investment 
and payout covenant score (ܨܫܲ	ܥ݋ݒ݁݊ܽ݊ݐ௝), respectively. All specifications include year-month fixed effects , as 
well as bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls (coefficients are not reported for parsimony). The table reports OLS 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
firm and year-month. A detailed presentation of all variable definitions is provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 6: Mitigating Potential Endogeneity Concerns 
 
Panel A: Two-Stages Least Squares (2-SLS) Estimation 
  2-SLS Estimation 
Dependent variables:  
   ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤
ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent variables: 1st Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 1st Stage 1st Stage 2nd Stage 
Intercept 0.179*** 0.001 0.009*** 0.216*** 0.001 0.011 
(34.02) (1.30) (8.12) (17.79) (0.79) (1.17) 
ܻ݋ݑ݊݃ ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊ݕ௜,௤	 0.013*** -0.000     0.003*** -0.000   
		 (11.76) (-0.10)     (3.66) (-0.37)   
ܮ݋݊݃ ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ܥݕ݈ܿ݁௜,௤	 0.022*** 0.000     0.003*** 0.000   
		 (29.75) (1.41)     (2.98) (0.33)   
ܻ݋ݑ݊݃ ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊ݕ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.006 0.016***     0.017 0.016***   
		 (0.30) (7.31)     (1.08) (7.32)   
ܮ݋݊݃ ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ܥݕ݈ܿ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.031** 0.024***     0.029*** 0.024***   
		 (2.52) (16.20)     (2.87) (16.16)   
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 0.012*** -0.027 
(2.74) (-0.65) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	     0.300***       0.352*** 
		     (4.31)       (4.04) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	 0.083 0.120*** 0.023*** 0.148** 0.120*** 0.023*** 
(1.13) (13.28) (10.67) (2.41) (13.25) (10.34) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠	 0.081*** -0.002 0.018*** 0.029 -0.004* 0.011** 
		 (3.31) (-1.06) (3.80)   (1.55) (-1.86) (2.19) 
Firm controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Bond controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes   Yes Yes Yes 
Partial F-test of excluded instruments 114.54 58.40 9.96 56.02 
Over-identifying restrictions test p-value 0.495 0.163 
Endogeneity test p-value 0.188 0.413 
Obs. 48,597 48,597 48,597 48,597 48,597 48,597 
Adj. R2 0.5206 0.2697 0.1519 0.6945 0.2723 0.1613 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Controlling for Audit Litigation Risk and Firm Litigation Risk 
  Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.007*** 0.009*** 0.007*** 0.002 0.005** 0.002 
(13.18) (20.99) (12.82) (0.99) (2.39) (1.03) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.017 0.023*** 0.017 0.019 0.022*** 0.020 
(0.57) (5.51) (0.58) (0.69) (5.44) (0.69) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 0.008** 0.008** 0.008** 0.002 0.002 0.002 
(2.34) (2.34) (2.38) (0.65) (0.64) (0.65) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.234*** 0.232*** 0.233*** 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.242*** 
(5.11) (5.17) (5.18) (5.24) (5.31) (5.31) 
ܣݑ݀݅ݐ ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௬ 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002***  0.002*** 
(3.11) (3.10) (2.71)  (2.70) 
ܣݑ݀݅ݐ ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௬ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.005 0.005 0.002  0.002 
(0.18) (0.19) (0.08)  (0.09) 
ܨ݅ݎ݉ ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊ ܴ݅ݏ݇௜ 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 
(0.71) (0.69)  (1.13) (1.18) 
ܨ݅ݎ݉ ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊ ܴ݅ݏ݇௜ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ -0.002 -0.002  -0.002 -0.002 
(-0.34) (-0.34)  (-0.36) (-0.37) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.010 0.010 0.010 
  (2.88) (2.84) (2.86) (1.57) (1.60) (1.59) 
Bond controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Firm controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Macro controls No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 48,597 48,597 48,597 48,597 48,597 48,597 
Adj. R2 0.1553 0.1552 0.1552 0.1644 0.1643 0.1644 
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Table 6 (continued) 
 
Panel C: Fixed Effects Specification 
  Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) 
Intercept 0.010*** -0.002 
(23.44) (-0.34) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.022*** 0.021*** 
(6.39) (6.09) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ ௜݁,௤ 0.002 0.003 
(0.50) (0.77) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ ௜݁,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.241*** 0.239*** 
  (5.18) (5.04) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ 0.015** 0.009 
  (2.21) (1.13) 
Bond controls No Yes 
Firm controls No Yes 
Macro controls No Yes 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes 
Obs. 48,597 48,597 
Adj. R2 0.1576 0.1647 
This table reports results from three different sets of analyses conducted to mitigate potential endogeneity concerns. 
Panel A presents regression results from a two-stages least squares (2SLS) estimation with ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ instrumented 
using ܻ݋ݑ݊݃	ܥ݋݉݌ܽ݊ݕ௜,௤ and  ܮ݋݊݃	ܫ݊ݒ݁ݏݐ݉݁݊ݐ	ܥݕ݈ܿ ௜݁,௤. Partial F-tests of excluded instruments in columns (1), 
(2), (4) and (5), p-values from tests of over-identifying restrictions in columns (3) and (6), and p-values from 
endogeneity tests performed on the 2-SLS estimations are reported. All specifications include year-month fixed 
effects, as well as bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls in the specifications presented in columns (4), (5), and (6) 
(coefficients are not reported for parsimony). 2-SLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics are based 
on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year-month. Panel B presents: (i) the base model 
augmented with the audit litigation risk proxy (ܣݑ݀݅ݐ	ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴ݅ݏ݇௜,௬) in columns (1) and (4); (ii) the base 
model augmented with the firm litigation risk proxy (ܨ݅ݎ݉	ܮ݅ݐ݅݃ܽݐ݅݋݊	ܴ݅ݏ݇௜) in columns (2) and (5); and (iii) the 
base model augmented with both firm and audit litigation risk proxies in columns (3) and (6). Panel C reports 
regression results from a firm fixed effects estimation. All specifications include year-month fixed effects, as well as 
bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls in the specification presented in column (2). OLS coefficient estimates and 
(in parentheses) t-statistics are based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year-month. 
A detailed presentation of all variable definitions is provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 7: Alternative Measures of Accounting Conservatism 
 
  Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.010*** 0.006*** 0.010*** 0.006*** 
(20.61) (2.75) (32.43) (2.78) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.005 0.004 0.015*** 0.015*** 
(1.47) (1.24) (3.75) (3.68) 
ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ 0.001** 0.001** 
(2.46) (2.54) 
ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.021*** 0.021***     
  (3.67) (3.95)     
ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤ 0.001 -0.000 
(0.38) (-0.07) 
ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠     0.106*** 0.103*** 
      (3.24) (3.10) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ 0.022*** 0.010 0.032*** 0.014* 
  (3.05) (1.40) (3.02) (1.78) 
Bond controls No Yes No Yes 
Firm controls No Yes No Yes 
Macro controls No Yes No Yes 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 39,240 39,240 37,669 37,669 
Adj. R2 0.1537 0.1639 0.1480 0.1570 
This table reports regressions of corporate bond returns on equity returns, treasury returns and accounting 
conservatism proxied by alternative measure of accounting conservatism (ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ and ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤). The 
interaction terms ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (in columns (1) and (2)) and ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (in 
columns (3) and (4)) capture the incremental stock-bond return co-movement for conservative firms. All 
specifications include year-month fixed effects, as well as bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls in the 
specifications presented in columns (2) and (4) (coefficients are not reported for parsimony). The table reports OLS 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
firm and year-month. A detailed presentation of all variable definitions is provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 8: Controlling for the Inputs to the C-Score Measure 
 
  Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Intercept 0.010*** 0.011*** 0.010*** 0.011*** 
(3.90) (18.65) (22.33) (4.09) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.102*** 0.004 0.042*** 0.080*** 
(4.70) (0.62) (5.16) (3.47) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.010*** 
(2.75) (2.78) (2.66) (2.69) 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ሻ 0.179*** 0.195*** 0.196*** 0.142*** 
 (3.53) (3.66) (3.83) (2.61) 
ܮ݊ሺܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤ሻ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.000 0.000 
  (0.09) (0.03) 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤ -0.010***   -0.008** 
 (-3.91)   (-2.46) 
ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠  -0.000  -0.000 
   (-0.27)  (-0.29) 
ܯܶܤ௜,௤ 0.041** 0.031* 
(2.48) (1.92) 
ܯܶܤ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.000 0.000 
  (0.77) (0.50) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ -0.011*** -0.005 
  (-3.17) (-1.13) 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 15,438 15,438 15,438 15,438 
Adj. R2 0.1503 0.1499 0.1501 0.1506 
This table reports regressions of corporate bond returns on equity returns, treasury returns and accounting 
conservatism controlling for the inputs (ܮ݊ሺܨ݅ݎ݉	ܵ݅ݖ݁௜,௤, ܮ݁ݒ݁ݎܽ݃݁௜,௤ and ܯܶܤ௜,௤) to the ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁ measure (Khan 
and Watts, 2009) and their respective interactions with ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠. The interaction term ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠	captures the incremental stock-bond return co-movement for conservative firms. All 
specifications include year-month fixed effects (coefficients are not reported for parsimony). The table reports OLS 
coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by 
firm and year-month. A detailed presentation of all variable definitions is provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * 
denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
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Table 9: Representative Bond Analysis 
 
  Dependent variable: ܤ݋݊݀ ܴ݁ݐݑݎ ௝݊,௠ 
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 0.010*** 0.004* 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.011*** 0.005** 
(24.28) (1.77) (30.77) (3.04) (29.51) (2.38) 
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.019*** 0.018*** -0.002 -0.001 0.017*** 0.017*** 
(5.64) (5.45) (-0.42) (-0.23) (4.56) (4.51) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ 0.010** 0.008** 
(2.41) (2.18) 
ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ 0.239*** 0.242***         
  (4.87) (5.03)         
ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ 0.001 0.001 
(1.23) (1.29) 
ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠     0.032*** 0.031***     
      (5.30) (5.21)     
ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤ 0.001 -0.001 
(0.69) (-0.77) 
ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠         0.110** 0.108** 
          (2.53) (2.49) 
ܶݎ݁ܽݏݑݎݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௝,௠ 0.025** 0.018** 0.025** 0.012 0.071*** 0.046*** 
 (2.56) (2.00) (2.20) (1.22) (4.45) (3.41) 
Bond controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Firm controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Macro controls No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Year-Month fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 15,438 15,438 12,450 12,450 12,479 12,479 
Adj. R2 0.1494 0.1580 0.1534 0.1630 0.1447 0.1533 
This table reports regressions of corporate bond returns on equity returns, treasury returns and accounting 
conservatism for a sample of representative bonds. Representative bonds are selected following the criteria in 
Haesen et al. (2013) and specifically bonds are selected on the basis of (i) seniority, (ii) maturity, (iii) age, and (iv) 
size. The interaction terms ܥ‐ܵܿ݋ݎ݁௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (in columns (1) and (2)),	ܥ݈݈ܽ݁݊	ܥܴ௜,௤ ൈ
ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (in columns (3) and (4)) and ܤܽݏݑ௜,௤ ൈ ܧݍݑ݅ݐݕ	ܴ݁ݐݑݎ݊௜,௠ (in columns (5) and (6)) capture the 
incremental stock-bond return co-movement for conservative firms. All specifications include year-month fixed 
effects, as well as bond-, firm-, and macro-level controls in the specifications presented in columns (2), (4), and (6) 
(coefficients are not reported for parsimony). The table reports OLS coefficient estimates and (in parentheses) t-
statistics based on heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors clustered by firm and year-month. A detailed 
presentation of all variable definitions is provided in the Appendix. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at 
the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels (two-tailed), respectively. 
